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INTRODUCTION 
The idea that consideration of error costs should inform judgments about actions with 
uncertain consequences is well established.  When we act on imperfect information, we estimate 
not only the probability of an event, but also the expected costs of making an error.  To take a 
simple example, if a driver is stopped at the tracks and sees a train coming, she must decide 
whether to cross or wait for the train to pass.  Using her eyes and experience, she can only 
estimate how far away the train is or how fast it is moving.  She may guess wrong.  Assume it is 
equally likely that her estimate will be either too long or too short.  However, if she errs on the 
side of caution, she will have lost a few minutes waiting while the train passes.  If she errs in the 
other direction, however, she might lose her life, those of her passengers, and her automobile. 
While the probability of error might be even, the stakes are asymmetric.  In the example 
they are so wildly asymmetric that prudence suggests a strong bias in favor of waiting.  For 
example, assume that the likelihood of a wrong estimate is unbiased and fifty-fifty in either 
direction.  However, if the cost of a false positive (waiting unnecessarily) is $2 in lost time while 
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the cost of a false negative (getting hit) is $10 million, the driver will be strongly biased in favor 
of waiting.  Even if not getting hit is significantly more likely, the imbalance in consequences 
will incline her to wait. 
Antitrust decision makers, including judges, are in a similar situation.  Information about 
the consequences of a contemplated enforcement action is imperfect.  An injunction, divestiture, 
or other remedy could be overdeterrent, but failure to grant the remedy could be underdeterrent.  
Should the standard for action be “more likely than not,” which is neutral?  Or should we have a 
bias that favors either enforcement or non-enforcement? 
The problem of error cost bias has had a broad and deep influence in antitrust cases, long 
before it was articulated in those words.  It affects the formation of presumptions and burdens of 
proof.  For example, it guided the Supreme Court’s sixty-year presumption, first developed in the 
1940s, that patents posed inherent dangers to competition.  As a result, they should be presumed 
to create market power in at least some cases.1  In 1950 it resulted in amendments to the Clayton 
Act that produced a significant pro-enforcement bias in merger policy.2  That bias led Justice 
Potter Stewart to observe in a dissent that the “sole consistency” he could find in merger cases 
was that “the Government always wins.”3 
The modern error-cost argument favoring non-enforcement of antitrust law is popularly 
attributed to Judge Frank Easterbrook’s important 1984 article on The Limits of Antitrust.  He 
wrote: 
A fundamental difficulty facing the court is the incommensurability of the stakes.  
If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may be lost for 
good.  Any other firm that uses the condemned practice faces sanctions in the 
name of stare decisis, no matter the benefits.  If the court errs by permitting a 
deleterious practice, though, the welfare loss decreases over time.  Monopoly is 
self-destructive. Monopoly prices eventually attract entry. True, this long run may 
be a long time coming, with loss to society in the interim.  The central purpose of 
antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the long run.  But this should not obscure the 
point:  judicial errors that tolerate baleful practices are self-correcting while 
erroneous condemnations are not.4 
 
1 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (speaking of patent monopoly as making post-patent 
practices competitively suspect); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (applying the 
presumption of monopoly power in an antitrust case).  Both decisions were overruled by Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. 
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).  
2 See discussion infra, text at notes 107-110. 
3 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Steward, J., dissenting). 
4 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1984) (emphasis added).  Judge Easterbrook 
was a law professor at the University of Chicago at the time but became a judge on the Seventh Circuit in 1985.  The 
error costs of rule-making had been explored, although in different contexts, in Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, 
An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 257 (1974).  For particular application to predatory 
pricing law, see Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klovorick, A Framework for Analysis Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 
YALE L.J. 213 (1979). 
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Easterbrook found support in the belief that monopoly is “self-destructive” and that the 
social cost of an anticompetitive practice “decreases over time.”5  In the long run markets move 
themselves toward greater competition, he argued, provided that the legal system does not 
intervene.  A false positive will delay the arrival of this long run, while a false negative will let 
the market move unmolested to its more competitive equilibrium.  An unfortunate, overly 
aggressive antitrust decree can force firms to pull their competitive punches or even prohibit 
efficient activity.  In that case the purifying process would be slowed or even stopped.6 
Important Supreme Court decisions in subsequent years used the error cost framework to 
justify rules limiting liability.  For example, in Matsushita, which greatly increased the 
likelihood of summary judgment in favor of defendants in antitrust cases, the Court concluded 
that “mistaken inferences” in favor of plaintiffs are “especially costly.”7  Later, in its Trinko 
decision, which did a version of the same thing for motions to dismiss, the Court spoke at length 
of the social cost of false positives.8  In sum, the antitrust error cost framework shifted the 
ground radically against plaintiffs in the two most important procedural antitrust decisions in 
decades.9  Expansive anti-enforcement rules for motions to dismiss and summary judgment have 
had a considerable influence on antitrust litigation, upending a more neutral balance that had 
existed for decades.10 
This error cost framework also motivated the liability-limiting Guidance on §2 of the 
Sherman Act that the Antitrust Division issued near the end of the George W. Bush 
administration in 2008.  The government’s statement concluded that decisions about whether to 
bring §2 cases should take error costs into account.11  “Decision theory teaches that optimal legal 
standards should minimize the inevitable error and enforcement costs. . . .”12  The statement then 
went on to identify the costs of false positives and false negatives, arguing that the cost of false 
positives was higher than the cost of false negatives.13 
 
5 Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 2.  For insightful objections, see Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error out of “Error 
Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2015). 
6 In other contexts, see Erik Hovenkamp & Steven C. Salop, Asymmetric Stakes in Antitrust Litigation (USC Legal 
Stud. Res. Papers Series, Working Paper No. 20-12 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3563843 [perma.cc/MR53-8ZPU]. 
7 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (citing Easterbrook, supra note 4). 
8 Verizon Comm’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414-15 (2004). 
9 See also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 233 (1993) (emphasizing that 
competitive explanations must be preferred when evidence is ambiguous, citing Easterbrook, supra note 4); Atlantic 
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 345 (1990) (arguing similar principles related to resale price 
maintenance, citing Easterbrook, supra note 4). 
10 See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the 
Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 364-66 (2013) (discussing trends in judicial procedure, 
especially dismissal mechanisms). 
11 Single-Firm Conduct and Section 2 of the Sherman Act: An Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 8, 2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-under-section-2-sherman-act-chapter-
1#N_106_ [perma.cc/LB7Z-MQ8L].   The FTC did not join the Antitrust Division in the Report. 
12 Id. at part III-G.  
13 Id., the statement continued: 
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The Antitrust Division’s statement on §2 was withdrawn less than a year later, during the 
first year of the Obama administration.14  The withdrawal statement concluded that the earlier 
document “raised too many hurdles to government antitrust enforcement. . . .”15  Christina A. 
Varney, head of the Antitrust Division, stated that “The Division will return to tried and true case 
law and Supreme Court precedent in enforcing the antitrust laws.”16   
The Justice Department’s antitrust division once again used the error cost idea in its 
statement of the “New Madison” doctrine during the Trump administration.  Under the 
statement, the Justice Department would largely avoid antitrust enforcement of licensing 
agreements involving patents, particularly patents that are essential to network standards.17   
At this writing the statement of the “New Madison” doctrine appears to be on life 
support.18  This pushback notwithstanding, the error cost framework continues to capture some 
conservatives.  It appeared in 2018 in the oral argument of the Ohio v. American Express case.19  
Justice Gorsuch queried, “why shouldn't we take Judge Easterbrook's admonition seriously, that 
 
In the common law regime of antitrust law, stare decisis inhibits courts from routinely correcting 
errors or updating the law to reflect the latest advances in economic thinking. Some believe that 
the persistence of errors can be particularly harmful to competition in the case of false positives 
because "[i]f the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may be lost for good. 
Any other firm that uses the condemned practice faces sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no 
matter the benefits." In contrast, over time "monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly prices 
eventually attract entry. . . . [Thus] judicial errors that tolerate baleful practices are self-correcting, 
while erroneous condemnations are not." This self-correcting tendency, however, may take 
substantial time. As a result, courts and enforcers should be sensitive to the potential that, once 
created, some monopolies may prove quite durable, especially if allowed to erect entry barriers 
and engage in other exclusionary conduct aimed at artificially prolonging their existence. 
(citations omitted). 
14 Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (May 11, 2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-withdraws-report-antitrust-monopoly-law [perma.cc/X35U-
EWNT].  
15 Id.   
16 Id. 
17 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Just., The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property Law (Mar. 16, 2018) (transcript available at Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim 
Delivers Keynote Address at University of Pennsylvania Law School, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-keynote-address-university 
[perma.cc/VXB2-GECD]).  For a critique, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The DOJ’s “New Madison” Doctrine 
Disregards Both the Economics and the Law of Innovation, PROMARKET (Sept. 8, 2021), 
https://promarket.org/2021/09/08/doj-madison-doctrine-antitrust-innovation/ [perma.cc/QD7F-YLWW].  
18 See Kathryn Mims et al., DOJ Antitrust Division Quietly Walks Back Prior Administration-Era Support of 
Standard Essential Patent Holders, WHITE & CASE (May 26, 2021), 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/doj-antitrust-division-quietly-walks-back-prior-administration-era-
support [perma.cc/F52C-U3PS] (discussing the Antitrust Division’s reclassification of the 2020 Supplement as 
“advocacy”).  
19 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
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judicial errors are a lot harder to correct than an occasional monopoly where you can hope and 
assume that the market will eventually correct it.  Judicial errors are very difficult to correct."20 
Justice Gorsuch’s question suggests a premise that has by no means been established–
namely, that judicial errors are harder or more costly to correct than errors that lead to monopoly 
or other anticompetitive market structures.  Suppose that the two assumptions underlying the 
anti-enforcement error cost approach are incorrect.  First, suppose that competition is actually the 
more fragile state.  Second, what if courts correct pro-enforcement errors more quickly than 
Easterbrook assumed?  If one or both of these things are true, we could have the error-cost 
presumption backwards.  The consequence could be socially costly under-enforcement. 
In his 2021 opinion for the Court in NCAA v. Alston, Justice Gorsuch himself observed 
one strong consequence of anti-enforcement error cost bias:  plaintiffs lose nearly all of their rule 
of reason antitrust cases.21  Under antitrust’s rule of reason, the plaintiff must make out a prima 
facie case of competitive harm.  The burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to provide a 
justification.  If the defendant succeeds, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the 
same effect could have been achieved with a less competitively harmful alternative.22  This 
three-step burden-shifting framework is designed to be based on such enforcement-neutral 
factors as the presence of market power and the nature and availability of evidence.23  Courts 
have responded by loading so many requirements into the plaintiff’s prima facie case, however, 
that the burden rarely shifts.  That is to say, it is not really a “prima facie” case.  Justice Gorsuch 
observed that the courts have “disposed of nearly all rule of reason cases in the last 45 years” 
without ever getting to the second step.24  Given that the best evidence for the motives and 
effects of the defendant’s conduct is in the defendant’s control, the result is a lopsided rule that 
ends up overlooking instances of competitive harm. 
Easterbrook’s observations were based on a model of perfect competition that was 
dominant at one time within Chicago School economics, but by that time was already falling 
apart.25  The consequences of a change in assumptions are difficult to exaggerate.  If markets 
naturally move away from competitive equilibria toward more dominated or less competitive 
ones, then false negatives could be more costly than false positives.  For example, even an overly 
broad merger rule that prevented a firm from attaining all available efficiencies via acquisition 
might be preferable if it prevented the emergence of monopoly.  This would be particularly likely 
if the monopoly were costly, or if firms could develop similar efficiencies without the need to 
merge.26  Merger analysis under the antitrust enforcement Agencies’ 2010 Horizontal Merger 
 
20 Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (No. 16-1454). 
21 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021). 
22 Id. at 2160 (citing Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284). 
23 See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1507 (4th ed. 2018). 
24 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2161. 
25 See discussion infra, text at notes 221-251. 
26 On this point, see Louis Kaplow, Efficiencies in Merger Analysis, 83 ANTITRUST L.J. 557 (2021), who observes 
that most efficiencies are not merger specific because there are good contractual alternatives.  For a similar 
argument with respect to vertical mergers, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Competitive Harm from Vertical Mergers, 39 
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Guidelines insists that efficiencies must be shown to be “merger specific.”  This means that they 
would be unlikely to result from mechanisms other than the merger.27 
By the 1980s Easterbrook was already writing defensively. The framework he offered 
was relatively novel in law schools.  However, the economics upon which it was based was 
rapidly losing ground in mainstream economics departments, replaced by alternatives that did 
better under testing and provided more explanatory power for policy purposes.28  Further, they 
favored intervention more frequently.29 
The same thing was also true of the second blade of the scissors:  by the mid-eighties it 
was already quite clear that courts were readily capable of correcting judicial errors of over-
enforcement.  There is no ratchet in antitrust law making.  While res judicata might require a 
court to adhere to a ruling governing the same conduct by the same parties, beyond that both 
courts and legislators are free to change their minds when new information or policy initiatives 
emerge.  Stare decisis tends to preserve some precise rulings, but courts construe their own 
rulings more broadly or narrowly as perspectives change.  For example, in the early 1990s the 
Supreme Court developed an aggressive “lock-in” theory of market power,30 but resistance 
proved so substantial that few courts have applied it.31 
By the time of Easterbrook’s error cost essay, the Supreme Court was already well on its 
way to developing a more neutral way of dealing with error costs.32  Further, some of the errors 
had not persisted all that long.  For example, in Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania the Supreme 
Court overruled a per se rule against vertical nonprice restraints that at the time was only ten 
years old.33  That rule had reflected a strong pro-enforcement bias that was based on a severe 
misunderstanding of vertical distribution systems in a product differentiated economy.  By that 
time the Court had also significantly strengthened the market power requirement for tying 
cases,34 raised the requirements for proof of competitive harm in private antitrust actions,35 and 
 
Rev. Indus. Org. (2021), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3683386 
[perma.cc/2DPC-NKF7]. 
27 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §10 (2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 [perma.cc/2USF-T5VG]. 
28 For a good contemporary illustration, see FED. TRADE COMM’N, STRATEGY, PREDATION AND ANTITRUST 
ANALYSIS (Steven C. Salop ed., 1981),  https://www.ftc.gov/reports/strategy-predation-antitrust-analysis 
[perma.cc/6Q4V-MDJM] (recognizing that predatory and other exclusionary pricing strategies were rising in the 
economics literature just as they were being denigrated in the legal literature).  
29 See discussion infra, text at notes 221-251 
30 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
31 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §3.3a (6th 
ed. 2020) (discussing “lock-in”). 
32 See generally Carl Shapiro, Antitrust: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It, 35 ANTITRUST, Summer 2021, at 33, 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/fixingantitrust.pdf [perma.cc/28EP-83J3] (discussing the historical 
disconnect between federal antitrust enforcement and microeconomics). 
33 Continental TV, Inc. vs. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & 
Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)). 
34 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). 
35 Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (narrowing private 
plaintiff standing); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (requiring “antitrust injury”). 
2021 Antitrust Error Costs 7 
 
considerably cut back on the strongly structural premises of merger enforcement in the 1960s.36  
All of these were positive developments that aligned antitrust with more centrist economic 
theory.  Two years after The Limits of Antitrust was written, the Court would dramatically alter 
the doctrine of summary judgment, making it considerably more difficult for plaintiffs to get to 
trial.37  By 1984 both of the premises of the anti-enforcement error cost bias were demonstrably 
false. 
This article explores the origins of the error-cost anti-enforcement bias in antitrust.  It 
focuses mainly on the first of Judge Easterbrook’s premises, which is that markets tend to correct 
themselves unless overly aggressive antitrust rules get in the way.  The origins of that premise 
stretch back to the Chicago School’s development in the 1940s.38  Many of its founders were 
members of the  libertarian and positivist Mont Pelerin Society.39  The Society’s stated 
commitment to scientific testability proved to be its undoing, as imperfect competition models 
came to win the testability battle.40 
The Chicago School approach to antitrust economics began its ascendancy in American 
law schools in the late 1970s, just as its influence was waning in economics departments.41  
Today it is in sharp decline even among legal academics.42  Further, there is ample evidence that, 
at least at the market level, monopoly is hardly uncommon and that it often fails to correct 
itself.43  The social cost of monopoly today is very likely much higher than the literature from the 
Chicago School’s early period imagined.44  Both the ubiquity and the persistence of monopoly in 
 
36 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (weakening merger presumptions based on market 
share). 
37 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
38 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 168 
Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 1843 (2020) (placing the Chicago School in the antitrust framework). 
39 Id. at 1847-1848; Rob Van Horn and Philip Mirowski, The Rise of the Chicago School of Economics and the Birth 
of Neoliberalism, in THE ROAD FROM MONT PELERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE, 
158 (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds., 2015).  For a good short essay on the relationship among the Mont 
Pelerin Society and Chicago School intellectuals such as Aaron Director, see William Kolasky, Aaron Director and 
the Origins of the Chicago School of Antitrust, Part II—Aaron Director: The Socrates of Hyde Park, 35 ANTITRUST 
101 (2020).  On the early development, focusing on the Chicago economics department, see BUILDING CHICAGO 
ECONOMICS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL ECONOMICS PROGRAM (Robert 
Van Horn, Philip Mirowski & Thomas A. Stapleford eds., 2011). 
40 See discussion infra, text at notes 165-229. 
41 See Baker, supra note 5 at 1 n.1 (2015) (speaking of Chicago School economics as flourishing until the mid-
seventies and of its dominance in law schools arising in the mid- to late 1970s). See also Nicola Giocoli, Old Lady 
Charm: Explaining the Persistent Approach of Chicago Antitrust, 22 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 96 (2015) (searching 
for explanations why the Chicago School has persisted in law schools long after it faded in economic departments). 
42 Although not among all.  See, e.g., Thomas A. Lambert, The Limits of Antitrust in the 21st Century, 68 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1087 (2020); George L. Priest, The Limits of Antitrust and the Chicago School Tradition, 6 J. COMP. L. & 
ECON. 1 (2009) (both defending the error cost model). 
43 See discussion infra, test at notes 252-262. 
44 See, e.g., Arnold Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 77 AM. ECON. ASSN. PAPER & PROC. 77 (1953) 
(limiting social cost of monopoly to its formal deadweight loss cause by inefficient customer substitutions).  Contra,  
Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975) (social cost of 
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the economy have been well established under a variety of methodologies.45  Monopoly markups 
are significantly higher than they were in the 1980s, and by some measures have tripled.46  This 
sounds like a great deal more than the “occasional” and ephemeral monopoly that Justice 
Gorsuch acknowledged. 
Judge Easterbrook suggested that the cost of any monopoly resulting from an 
underdeterrent legal rule will decrease over time.  Whether or not that is true, it is clearly the 
case for overdeterrent rules.  Firms are pretty good at inventing around legal rules.  An 
incorrectly issued injunction might have very little consequence if those bound by it can simply 
select another route.  The urge to compete is particularly robust and firms often can invent 
around an unreasonably restrictive legal rule.  For example, the per se rules against resale price 
maintenance and tying were excessive, but firms developed workarounds.47  An overly 
aggressive decision condemning a merger might not cause that much harm if the firms can attain 
the benefits of merging by another route. 
The economic case for an error cost bias against antitrust enforcement was losing ground 
at the time it was articulated in the 1980s and is even less defensible today.  Further, it fails to 
protect antitrust’s goals of facilitating high output and low prices.  That leaves the question of 
whether there should be such a presumption at all and, if so, what it should be. 
Given what we know about markets today, if we were forced to make a presumption, a 
pro-enforcement bias would be preferable, at least in trouble-prone markets.48  But I am not 
advocating for that.  Rather, the screens that antitrust already uses in the formation of substantive 
rules should suffice.  Among these, the most important are the rule of reason and its 
accompanying requirement of market power.  When these prerequisites are taken seriously, an 
error cost bias in either direction represents a form of double counting that threatens to 
undermine sound enforcement goals. 
 
monopoly much higher when rent seeking is acknowledged).  The literature is evaluated in Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of Monopoly, 78 IOWA L. REV. 371 (1993).  
45 See discussion infra, text at notes 252-262. 
46 See discussion infra, text at notes 252-262; Bonnie Kavoussi, How Market Power Has Increased U.S. Inequality, 
WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (May 3, 2019), https://equitablegrowth.org/how-market-power-has-increased-
u-s-inequality/ [perma.cc/MG9Z-VP7M]; Companies Appear to be Gaining Market Power, ECONOMIST (Jul. 6, 
2018), https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/07/06/companies-appear-to-be-gaining-market-power 
[perma.cc/9PMA-5XFN]; Federico Diez et al., Global Declining Competition, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RES. 
(Aug. 2, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/global-declining-competition [perma.cc/MWV3-95G5] (each offering 
examples of markups as a result of consolidate market power since the 1980s).  For a balanced discussion, see Jeff 
Cockrell, Does America Have an Antitrust Problem?, CHICAGO BOOTH REV. (2019), 
https://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2019/article/does-america-have-antitrust-
problem?fbclid=IwAR0ZXwFnUE2t0tcobHLcgMa6SviSZUShufBR1nvHUd6sDzm73o4guVOly_k 
[perma.cc/8ERS-FZ5E].   
47 E.g., Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronic Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (construing “price” narrowly in 
RPM cases); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (strengthening market power 
requirement for tying cases under per se rule); U. S. v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (establishing 
idiosyncratic agreement requirement for resale price maintenance). 
48 See discussion infra, text at notes 52-85. 
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Merger policy in particular has waffled between a fairly extreme pro-enforcement bias 
developed after the 1950 amendments to the merger statute to a fairly extreme anti-enforcement 
bias developed in the 1970s and 1980s.49  It would benefit from a stronger pro-enforcement 
presumption than the one that we currently have, although not as extreme as the ones that the 
Supreme Court developed in the 1960s.50  The way to get there, however, is not with an error 
cost presumption in either direction, but rather by continual empirical testing of post-acquisition 
results in order to determine whether we have set our sights too high or too low, as well as 
periodic revision of the Merger Guidelines in order to reflect what we continue to learn.51  No 
rule of judicial stare decisis prevents that. 
THE WANING OF PERFECT COMPETITION 
Easterbrook’s article reflected the neoliberal mindset of the 1980s, popularized in 
antitrust in the work of Robert Bork.52  Its anti-enforcement framework has persisted among 
conservatives, as Justice Gorsuch’s question suggests.53  In fact, however, the theoretical and 
empirical foundations for an anti-enforcement error cost bias were crumbling already by the 
1980s, even as Bork and Easterbrook were writing.  Their arguments were largely defensive and 
nostalgic. 
The debate in industrial organization economics over market competitiveness began 
mainly during the 1920s and after.54  The underlying question was whether the older theory of 
oligopoly or more recent theories of imperfect competition, including monopolistic competition, 
described important and durable characteristics of the economy.  Or were they simply minor and 
short-lived deviations from a much more robust perfect competition model in which competition, 
collusion, and monopoly described all the relevant states of the world?  Or worse yet, as Robert 
Bork would suggest, was oligopoly something that did not exist at all except in economics 
textbooks?55 
 
49 See discussion infra, text at notes 100-104. 
50 See Kevin Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy, 87 UNIV. CHI. L. 
REV. 331 (2020); Kevin Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions, 56 REV. INDUS. ORG. 
615 (2020) (analyzing historical merger enforcement trends). 
51 E.g., JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY, 
10-29 (2014) (suggesting empirical models for measuring concentrations and changes in concentrations of antitrust 
enforcement actions). 
52 See Hovenkamp & Morton, supra note 38 at 1847-48. 
53 See discussion supra, text at notes 20. 
54 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 105 
(1989). 
55 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 221 (1978) (“[N]on-collusive 
oligopolistic behavior, to the extent that it exists at all (and I am not persuaded that such behavior occurs outside of 
economics textbooks), rarely results in any significant ability to restrict output.  If that estimate is substantially 
accurate, then most mergers would not involve any dead-weight loss. . . .”). 
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Classical Competition and the Twentieth Century Response 
Prior to the 1930s, economists understood markets within a framework that embraced 
two alternative structures:  perfect competition and monopoly.  In the course of reviewing attacks 
on that model, George J. Stigler observed in 1949, “[b]efore the Great Depression . . . economists 
had generally looked upon the economy as a mixture of industries that approximated conditions 
of perfect competition and industries that were ‘monopolies.’”56 
That framework was developed and largely unquestioned by the British classical political 
economists all the way back to Adam Smith.  The great marginalist economist Alfred Marshall 
adhered to it in his Principles of Economics, which was published in 1890.  His book recognized 
competition and monopoly but almost nothing in between.57  While he was aware of Cournot’s 
theory of oligopoly,58 he did not incorporate it in any systematic way.59  Marshall’s most 
influential Eighth Edition, published in 1920, cited Cournot a few times for things such as the 
definition of a market, but not for his theory of oligopoly. Indeed, his book never used the word 
“oligopoly.”60 
Marshall’s approach of ignoring markets that fell between perfect competition and 
monopoly was described later as a “monstrosity.”61  Marshall had devoted a great deal of 
attention to a phenomenon, monopoly, that did not exist outside the realm of public utilities or 
other state granted exclusive franchises, while ignoring phenomena that were far more common 
in industry.  This also meant that Marshall simply assumed that all firms in a market faced the 
same demand curve.  As a result, there was no concept of a distinct “residual” demand for the 
output of a single firm in a multi-firm market.  Outside of monopoly, there was nothing 
interesting to study about the demand facing a single firm. 
The most important protagonists of alternative models were Joan Robinson of 
Cambridge, a student and admirer of Marshall, and Edward Chamberlin of Harvard.  Both 
published important books in 1933.62  Robinson never mentioned Cournot in her Economics of 
Imperfect Competition, although she did develop some concepts, such as marginal revenue, that 
 
56 George J. Stigler, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in  FIVE LECTURES ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 12 
(1949).  
57 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890). 
58 Developed in AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF 
WEALTH (1838) (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., 1897). 
59 Alberto Zanni, Marshall and Sraffa on Competition and Returns in Cournot, 20 HIST. ECON. IDEAS 75 (2012). 
60 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (8th ed. 1920), https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/marshall-
principles-of-economics-8th-ed [perma.cc/5C9P-YX9K].  
61 Kurt W. Rotschild, Price Theory and Oligopoly, 57 ECON. J. 299 (1947). 
62 JOAN ROBINSON, THE THEORY OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933); EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933).  For examples of important and influential predecessors who dealt with the 
importance of differences among individual firms, see JOHN MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
OVERHEAD COSTS (1925); Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929); Steven C. Salop, 
Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON. 141 (1979). 
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Cournot himself had either anticipated or developed.63  Chamberlin’s book began with an 
extended discussion of Cournot, but then branched off into theories about product differentiation 
for which his book later became best known.  Later neoliberal critics adhered more to the 
Marshallian status quo, most notably economists George Stigler64 and Milton Friedman.65 
The extensive debate that erupted over Robinson’s and Chamberlin’s work led to a 
dramatic increase of interest in Cournot and oligopoly theory.  The influential British economist 
Sir John Hicks described it in 1935 as a “renaissance.”66  In fact, it was oligopoly theory more 
than either Robinson or Chamberlin that in the short run migrated into antitrust enforcement 
policy.  It contributed to such actions as Sugar Institute vs. United States, which condemned an 
agreement to use a cartel facilitator,67 as well as the Interstate Circuit68 and American Tobacco 
cases.69  In these, the Supreme Court condemned parallel conduct without proof of an explicit 
agreement.  Indeed, the American Tobacco case went further in that direction than the more 
recent case law.  Another contemporary enforcement phenomenon was greatly increased interest 
in basing-point pricing, or situations where producers of fungible products could coordinate by 
eliminating competition on shipping costs.70  An area that reflected the influence of monopolistic 
competition theory was the 1940s Justice Department’s greatly increased scrutiny of intellectual 
property practices.  Patents and trademarks in particular were thought to be important vehicles 
 
63 See A.J. Nichols, Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition, 42 J. POL. ECON. 249, 252 (1934) (discussing 
marginal revenue).  Alfred Marshall also had a conception of marginal revenue, which he referred to as “net” 
revenue.  See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, Book V, Chapter XIV, at 477-78 (8th ed. 1920): 
The prima facie interest of the owner of a monopoly is clearly to adjust the supply to the demand, not in 
such a way that the price at which he can sell his commodity shall just cover its expenses of production, but 
in such a way as to afford him the greatest possible total net revenue. 
64 See discussion infra, text at notes 108-116. While Easterbrook discussed Stigler in The Limits of Antitrust, he 
addressed only Stigler’s theory of regulation, not his theory of market competition. Easterbrook, supra note 4 at 4-5 
& notes. 
65 See discussion infra, text at notes 136-140. 
66 John R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRICA 1, 13 (1935).  See 
Manuela Mosca, The Sources of Monopoly Power Before Bain (1956) 2 (SSRN Working Paper 2009), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1430322 [https://perma.cc/77FB-PV32] (discussing monopoly 
theories before this era). 
67 Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) (condemning sugar refiners’ agreement to post their prices 
periodically and adhere to them). 
68 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).  See also Maurice Adelman, Effective Competition 
and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1317-18 (1948) (summarizing the Interstate case). 
69 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).  For contemporary writing relating the decision to 
the theory of oligopoly, see William H. Nicholls, The Tobacco Case of 1946, 39 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS AND 
PROCEEDINGS) 284, 285-88 (1949); Kenneth E. Boulding, The Economic Consequences of Some Recent Antitrust 
Decisions, 39 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS) 311, 320 (1949).  See also WILLIAM FELLNER, 
COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW: OLIGOPOLY AND SIMILAR MARKET STRUCTURES (1949) (noting American 
Tobacco’s large market share in the tobacco industry).  
70 See Arthur Smithies, Economic Consequences of the Basing Point Decisions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1949) 
(relating basing-point schemes to monopolistic competition); Note, Price Systems and Competition: The Basing-
Point Issues, 58 YALE L.J. 426 (1949) (addressing basing-point pricing as a problem of oligopoly); FTC v. Cement 
Institute, 333 U.S. 583 (1948) (enforcing FTC order condemning basing point pricing in cement). 
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for maintaining monopoly and unhealthy product differentiation.71  One important example was 
the previously noted Supreme Court’s 1947 conclusion in International Salt Co. v. United States, 
at the behest of the Government, that monopoly would be presumed from the existence of a 
patent.72  Chamberlin himself was particularly hostile toward trademarks, which he believed 
were inherently monopolistic because they served to protect space between differentiated 
products.73 
Accompanying the increased focus on imperfectly competitive markets was a 
mathematical revolution in economic writing, including incorporation of game theory in the 
1940s and 1950s.74  In the process, the “pure” versions of Cournot’s oligopoly, Robinson’s 
imperfect competition, and Chamberlin’s monopolistic competition lost much of their 
distinctiveness.  They gradually became blended together into a set of theories that today go 
under the name “imperfect competition.”75  These theories departed from their creators’ original 
models in several ways.  The departures that were most relevant to competition policy were the 
accommodation of differentiated products into oligopoly theory, rejection of the classical 
assumption that new entry is easy and would occur whenever prices were above cost, and game 
theory. 
In the process oligopoly theory became more complex, depending on assumptions about 
firms’ initial choices and reactions.  Some explorations were concerned with single periods, but 
game theory introduced the idea of repeated cycles and a concept of equilibrium that included 
shared understanding of the anticipated responses of other firms.  Although Cournot himself had 
assumed markets for identical products, the new oligopoly theory also applied Cournot to 
differentiated products, in the process occupying some of the space belonging to monopolistic 
 
71 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870-1970 198-
203 (2015) (discussing the history of economic thought regarding patents and trademarks as monopoly and 
differentiation vehicles). 
72 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
73 CHAMBERLIN, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, supra note 60, at 57-64.  On the impact on competition, see Ralph S. 
Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171 n.29 
(1948) (speaking of Chamberlin’s influence); Kurt Borchart, Are Trademarks an Antitrust Problem?, 31 GEO. L.J. 
245 (1943).  For contemporary views on the use of patents to segregate markets, see DAVID LYNCH, THE 
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER  227-31 (1946). 
74 E.g., Oskar Morgenstern, Oligopoly, Monopolistic Competition, and the Theory of Games, 38 AM. ECON. REV, 
PAP. PROCED. 10 (1948) (discussing the relationship between competition and game theory), as well as the 
significant work by John F. Nash.  E.g., John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950) 
(discussing game theory).  See also Franklin Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND 
J. ECON. 113, 113–24 (1989) (outlining a revolution in game theory); Roger B. Myerson, Nash Equilibrium and the 
History of Economic Theory, 37 J. ECON LIT. 1067 (1999) (taking a historical approach to game theory). 
75 Many of these are explored in Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, Ch. 6, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. 
ORG. (Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter eds., 2007).  In the same volume, see also Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview, Ch. 5.  John Maurice 
Clark acknowledged the blending of theories already in 1940.  See John M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable 
Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1940) (discussing the intersection of imperfect competition and game 
theory). 
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competition.76  In short, the new theory began to reflect in a much more robust and eventually 
more testable way the manner in which firms in markets for manufactured products actually 
behave.  That was no small revolution in thinking about antitrust economics. 
Monopolistic Competition theory basically won by losing.  Students of oligopolistic 
industries began to model situations involving differentiated products.  Much of that theory also 
discarded Chamberlin’s assumption of unrestricted entry and focused on markets with small 
numbers of firms making differentiated products and where entry was thought to be difficult.77  
The policy reactions were increasingly dominated by a belief that oligopoly and product 
differentiation were more-or-less inevitable features of the business landscape, and the best that 
antitrust could do is prevent monopoly and otherwise reach peaceful coexistence with 
oligopolistic structures.78  
An important difference between Alfred Marshall’s image of the economy and that of 
Robinson and Chamberlin was that Marshall, just as most of the classical economists, had 
pictured production as consisting mainly of undifferentiated commodities.  While he allowed for 
differences in quality and distribution, the Marshallian world was mainly one in which 
competitors faced the same demand and competed mainly on price.  By contrast, both Robinson 
and Chamberlin addressed an economy that was more industrial, more differentiated, and more 
oriented toward distribution and consumers.  Important differences existed between the output of 
one firm and that of another.  Some of these differences pertained to differential cost structures, 
while others applied to product design, engineering, or distribution methods.  Further, over an 
intermediate or long run firms could make strategic choices about product or production design. 
The existence of these features was really not in dispute. Rather the questions were 
whether and how to acknowledge them, and whether they called for any amendments to the 
general insistence by classical political economists since Adam Smith that the “invisible hand” 
of the market could maximize value without government intervention. 
Joseph Schumpeter’s prescient 1934 review of Joan Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect 
Competition recognized the challenge her work presented to neoliberal, non-interventionist 
economics.79  Schumpeter described how thought about markets up to that time, with Cournot as 
an exception, had been dominated by a model of perfect competition and an offsetting model of 
“perfect monopoly.”80  Between the two, however, was a “stretch of ground” that was regarded 
“as rather unsafe and incapable of yielding determinate results.”81  Schumpeter-himself a 
 
76 Shapiro, supra note 73.  On the importance of this development, see Donald E. Farrar & Charles F. Phillips, Jr., 
New Developments on the Oligopoly Front: A Comment, 67 J. POL. ECON. 414 (1959). 
77 On Chamberlin’s assumptions of easy entry, see Joe S. Bain, Structure Versus Conduct as Indicators of Market 
Performance: The Chicago-School Attempts Revisited, 18 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 17, 29 (1986). 
78 E.g., John M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1940) (describing the 
conditions for “workable” as opposed to perfect competition); Corwin D. Edwards, Can the Antitrust Law Preserve 
Competition?, 30 AMER. ECON. REV. PAP. PROCEED. 164 (1940) (doubting the efficacy of American antitrust 
policy). 
79 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Robinson's Economics of Imperfect Competition, 42 J. POL. ECON. 249 (1934). 
80 Id. at 249. 
81 Id. at 249 
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conservative-observed that this state of affairs was unsatisfactory because “the majority of 
practical cases” lay on the ground between the two extremes.82  Further, the two cases at the 
extremes “are much farther removed from reality and much less likely to be fulfilled” than even 
Alfred Marshall believed.83 
Schumpeter’s conclusions were ominous: the state need not intervene in perfectly 
competitive markets, but these were uncommon.  Pure monopoly, also relatively rare, was 
subject to regulatory control.  As a result, an economy that exhibited only these two structural 
choices presented relatively infrequent need for antitrust intervention.  In the observed world, 
however, the vastness of the intermediate situations called for action: 
as soon as we realize the implications of imperfect competition all presumption 
vanishes for some of those effects to emerge which we used to attribute to the 
normal working of an economic society which in common parlance would still be 
called "competitive."  Our theorems about maximum satisfaction or maximum 
national dividend cease to hold true and the list of cases in which collective 
political action can increase both of them becomes so extended as to make these 
cases the rule rather than more or less curious exceptions.84 
 
Speaking as an economist, he observed, “if it be part of our business to advise on questions of 
economic policy, then this advice would in very many cases have to be the exact opposite of 
what it was twenty years ago.”85 
 
The Attempt to Redefine Oligopoly 
Stigler, who began his career in economics in the 1930s, became devoted to proving that 
Schumpeter’s assessment of the competitive landscape was wrong.86  Rather, he stayed on the 
path forged by Marshall, seeing perfect competition and monopoly as the only useful models of 
the industrial economy.  Already in 1937, Stigler, then a professor at Iowa State University, 
complained that the recently emergent theories of imperfect competition were receiving too 
much attention.  They were in fact little more than a “distracting fad” concerned more “with 
mathematical virtuosity than with desirable economic policy.”87  On that point he was at least 
 
82 Id. at 249-50. 
83 Id. at 250. 
84 Id. at 250-51. 
85 Id. at 250-51. 
86 See Craig Freedman, The Chicago School of Anti-Monopolistic Competition: Stigler’s Scorched Earth Campaign 
Against Chamberlin 165-342, in IN SEARCH OF THE TWO-HANDED ECONOMIST: IDEOLOGY, METHODOLOGY AND 
MARKETING IN ECONOMICS (Craig Freedman ed., 2016) (discussing Stigler’s work on competition); Richard S. 
Schmalensee, George Stigler’s Contribution to Economics, 85 SCAND. J. ECON. 77 (1983). 
87 George J. Stigler, A Generalization of the Theory of Imperfect Competition, 19 J. FARM ECON. 707, 708 (1937). 
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half correct:  the mathematics of oligopoly and monopolistic competition quickly became much 
more technical than the Marshallian mathematics of competition and monopoly.88 
Stigler argued that oligopoly was nothing more than a set of narrow exceptions to the 
traditional theory of collusion within a perfect competition model,89 and that monopolistic 
competition was nothing more than a variation on the theory of monopoly.90  In the process he 
set himself up as a fierce and lifelong champion of perfect competition and monopoly as the only 
two market equilibria worthy of study.91 
Cournot’s oligopoly theory was “non-cooperative,” meaning that it did not depend on any 
assumptions about communicated agreement.  Rather, each firm observed the output of rivals 
and equated marginal cost and marginal revenue over the remaining, or “residual,” demand.  The 
firms would make continuous adjustments until everyone in the market was in an equilibrium 
position.  That theory adapted itself to repeated iterations, or games, to the extent that firms 
could observe and then predict the behavior of others and learn from their observations.  In 1984, 
the same year as Easterbrook’s error cost article was published, political scientist Robert Axelrod 
provided both analytic support and breadth beyond industrial economics for this game theory in 
his influential book, The Evolution of Cooperation.92 
Already by mid-century, many antitrust economists and lawyers had come to believe that, 
given expansion in firm size and growing market concentration, oligopoly performance was 
“inevitable.”93  This was an important premise for the 1950 amendments to §7 of the Clayton 
Act,94 as well as decisions such as Brown Shoe that interpreted it.  Contemporary scholar Derek 
Bok saw oligopoly as one of the defining features of a changing industrial landscape.95  One 
 
88 On the marginalist revolution in the late nineteenth century and the dramatic increase in economists’ use of 
mathematics, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 
1870-1970 at 39-32, 85-87 (2015). 
89 E.g., George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964). 
90 E.g., George J. Stigler, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect 131-44, in READINGS IN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 
(C.K. Rowley ed., 1972). 
91 See George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1, 17 (1957) (“[T]he 
concept of perfect competition has defeated its newer rivals in the decisive area:  the day-to-day work of the 
economic theorist.”). 
92 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
93 E.g., Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals 
to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 666-68 (1962).  Accord Louis B. Schwartz, New Approaches to the Control of 
Oligopoly, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 33-34 (1978). See also CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: 
AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 27-28, 46, 111-19 (1959) (referring to “structural oligopoly” and 
recommending breakup).   
94 Cellar-Kefauver Antimerger Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), (codified at 15 U.S.C. §18).  See United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 280-81 (1964) (citing control of oligopoly as rationale for merger law).  See 
Simon N. Whitney, Mergers, Conglomerates, and Oligopolies: A Widening of Antitrust Targets, 21 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 187 (1967); James M. Henderson & William H. Henderson, The Race to Oligopoly, 1968 DUKE L.J. 637 
(1968). For Stigler’s evaluation, see George J. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 
(PAPERS & PROC. 23) (1950).  
95 Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 230, 
235 (1960) (noting Congress’ assumption that markets were being changed into oligopolies via a wave of mergers). 
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offered justification of the statutory revision was that “the country was in the midst of a new 
wave of mergers in which little businesses were being absorbed in large numbers by big firms.”  
As a result, “competitive, small-business industries such as textiles were steadily being 
transformed by mergers into oligopolies.”96 
Interestingly, the Sherman Act itself, drafted in 1890 long before modern theories of 
imperfect competition were developed, addressed behavior under the same rubric that both 
Marshall and the classical political economists had-namely competition and monopoly-ignoring 
the territory in between.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act reached “contracts, combinations, and 
conspiracies”–all practices that assume the existence of a more-or-less explicit cartel.  Section 2 
of the Sherman Act is concerned with monopoly.  There is no “§1.5” focused on intermediate 
situations, and antitrust policy ever since has had considerable difficulty in addressing them.97  
Stigler’s outlier theory of oligopoly, discussed below,98 was actually more consistent with this 
Sherman Act approach. 
Although Marshall’s Principles was published in the year that the Sherman Act was 
passed, there is no evidence that any member of Congress was familiar with it.  In fact, the 
Sherman Act was simply reflecting the English common law and economics of the time, which 
abhorred monopoly and disliked most forms of collusion but had no theory of oligopoly or 
imperfect competition. 
By contrast, the Clayton Act’s “may substantially lessen competition” formulation did 
not make the same distinctions.  Its lack of an agreement requirement could enable it to reach 
oligopoly positions that lay between the extremes.  What the Clayton Act did not include, 
however, was a provision that applied directly to coordinated interaction among competitors in 
the absence of an agreement or merger.  The “may substantially lessen competition” formulation 
in the Clayton Act occurs in three provisions:  §2 on price discrimination,99 §3 on tying and 
exclusive dealing,100 and §7 on mergers.101  Mergers that facilitated oligopoly were reachable, 
however even in the absence of a provable agreement.  As a result, after the 1950 Amendment 
merger policy emerged as one, although incomplete, way of filling in the gap that the Sherman 
Act had left.102 
 
96 Id. at 235.  For a complaint that the 1950 Act did not go far enough, see Damuel R. Reid, Antitrust and the 
‘Merger-Wave’ Phenomenon: A Failure of the Public Policy, 3 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 25 (1969) (noting a 
substantial merger wave in the late 1960s, after the Act was passed).  For good commentary, see Daniel A. Crane, 
Antitrust and Democracy: A Case Study from German Fascism (U. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper, No. 18-
009, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3164467 [https://perma.cc/34SK-GUE7]. 
97 On the numerous difficulties that have arisen in antitrust cases, see 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶1407, 1409-15, 1428-36 (4th ed. 2017). 
98 See discussion infra, text at notes 108-116. 
99 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2018). 
100 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018). 
101 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018). 
102 See Bok, supra note 95, at 230 (making this point). 
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The 1950 amendments to the merger statute did implicitly recognize imperfect 
competition, although in the process they also provoked an overreaction.103  The expressed 
concern was not with monopoly or cartels, but rather with rising industrial concentration itself.  
The statute’s prohibitions gave no hint of limitation to either mergers that produced an actual 
monopoly or those that facilitated collusion.  Further, the concentration levels that became 
identified as problematic were far lower than those that are regarded as such today.  Indeed, one 
goal was to protect small business from larger firms–something that could occur at any 
concentration level. 
Brown Shoe, the first Supreme Court decision to interpret the new merger statute, 
produced a pro-enforcement error cost bias that came to be ridiculed by people such as Robert H. 
Bork.104  The Brown Shoe theory was driven by its assumption, which was that American 
industry was exhibiting a “trend toward concentration.”105  This required a bias toward 
enforcement: “If a merger achieving 5% control were now approved, we might be required to 
approve future merger efforts by Brown's competitors seeking similar market shares.  The 
oligopoly Congress sought to avoid would then be furthered and it would be difficult to dissolve 
the combinations previously approved.”106 
The Court also made clear that its opposition to industry concentration was based on 
“Congress' fear not only of accelerated concentration of economic power on economic grounds, 
but also of the threat to other values a trend toward concentration was thought to pose.”107 
THE ORIGINS OF THE ERROR COST FRAMEWORK 
Stigler and Bork on Oligopoly 
 George J. Stigler had been one of the founding members of the libertarian Mont Pelerin 
Society and later served for one term as its President.108  In 1964, he published “A Theory of 
 
103 Bok, supra note 95; Herbert Hovenkamp, Derek Bok and the Merger of Law and Economics, 21 J. L. REFORM 
515, 534-35 (1988). 
104 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 198-216 (1978) (describing Brown 
Shoe as the “crash” of merger policy). 
105 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16, 332 (1962), citing Stigler, Mergers and Preventive 
Antitrust Policy, 104 U. OF PA. L. REV. 176, 180 (1955), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7445&context=penn_law_review 
[https://perma.cc/4EUT-PVNM]; S. REP. NO. 619, at 7 (1955).  (discussing a need for an amendment to the Clayton 
Act).  The Court also relied on the legislative history.  95 CONG. REC. 11,489, 11,494, 11,498 (1949) (remarks of 
Representatives Keating, Yates, and Patman); 96 CONG. REC. 16,444 (1950) (remarks of Senators O'Mahoney and 
Murray). 
106 Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 343-44. 
107 Id. at 316. 
108 See Van Horn & Mirowski, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  For Stigler’s own account, see his 
autobiography, GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 116 (1988).  See also Past 
Presidents, THE MONT PERLIN SOC’Y, https://www.montpelerin.org/past-presidents-2/ [https://perma.cc/CUC5-
XPJL] (last visited Nov. 17, 2021) (listing the Society’s roster of past presidents, including George Stigler, 1976-
1978).  
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Oligopoly,” now a Chicago School classic.109  His article never mentioned either Cournot or any 
other established economists in the literature of oligopoly.  Without saying it in so many words, 
he rejected the theory of oligopoly altogether, seeing the entire problem as one of “policing a 
collusive agreement, which proves to be a problem in the theory of information.”110 
 Stigler’s main critique of oligopoly was, first, to reject the proposition that any kind of 
collusive equilibrium, whether oligopoly or cartel, was stable as a general matter.111  This was in 
fact a head on attack against the noncooperative Cournot literature, which had proposed that 
stable oligopoly equilibria existed when each firm equated its individual marginal cost and 
marginal revenue over its residual demand.  By contrast, in a classic cartel each firm’s price is 
too high and output too low.112  Thus if one ignores rivals’ responses the Cournot equilibrium is 
more stable than the cartel equilibrium.  By contrast, for Stigler the firms in both situations were 
simply colluding, and they would try to find ways to compete by cheating on the collusive 
arrangement–that is, by producing more or charging less than a well-behaved cartel member 
should. 
Stigler observed that the contractual deals offered by different firms were quite 
heterogeneous, even when they were selling the same product.  Firms competed by offering 
slightly different terms than someone else.  This was not because the product varied but rather 
because consumer information and tastes varied.  As a result, there is no such thing as a single 
monopoly price.113  In fact, the “heterogeneity of purchase commitments . . . is surely often at 
least as large as that of products within an industry,” and “sometimes vastly larger.”114  What 
Stigler did not acknowledge is that this heterogeneity itself led to a form of monopolistic 
competition in which equilibrium prices often exceeded marginal cost and firms competed by 
offering different variations in contract terms.115 
 Successful collusion required the cartel to offer a joint maximizing range of variations to 
please customers.  However, this could require a complex agreement covering many types of 
transactions.  As a result, cartels often resorted to such devices as fixing market shares or output 
rather than price, or assigning particular buyers to particular sellers.116  Thus sheltered from 
competition, firms could then behave more like monopolists over their own sales. 
 
109 George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964). 
110 Id. at 44. 
111 On Stigler’s other work making a similar argument, see Schmalensee, supra note 86. 
112 I.e., at the cartel price each firm individually has an incentive to expand output to the point that its own marginal 
cost equals its individual marginal revenue.  See William L. Holahan, Cartel Problems: Comment, 68 AM. ECON. 
REV. 942 (1978) (discussing issues with cartel pricing). 
113 Stigler, supra note 109, at 45. 
114 Stigler, supra note 109, at 45. 
115 In fact, Stigler’s own model, presented in an appendix, showed prices above marginal cost, but Stigler did not 
elaborate the point.  Stigler, supra note 109, at 59-61.  I am indebted to Steve Salop for this observation.  For further 
development, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect Information, 69 AM. ECON. 
REV. PAPERS PROC. 339 (1979) (discussing the relationship between heterogeneity and pricing). 
116 Stigler, supra note 110, at 46. 
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 For Stigler, the enemy of successful collusion of all kinds was the firm that secretly cut 
prices or changed the product in order to steal sales from rivals.  Given the high price/cost 
margins of the successful cartel, the incentive to make undetectable cuts was strong.  As a result, 
oligopoly pricing was hardly “inevitable,” but depended on several factors at least some of which 
could be manipulated by individual firms. 
 The interesting thing about Stigler’s famous paper on oligopoly is that oligopoly never 
really makes an appearance at all.  It is in fact all about cartels, the difficulty of managing them, 
and the devices that cartel managers use to make them more stable.  Tellingly, his paper never 
once mentioned equilibrium.  A decisive contribution of Cournot’s theory was its proof of an 
equilibrium among its participants.  By contrast, in an explicit cartel a stable situation exists only 
to the extent that an agreement is made and enforced, and enforcement through the judicial 
system is usually not available. 
To the extent Stigler’s paper presented any theory of oligopoly at all, it was in the 
observation that certain market structures made collusion more plausible.  Very largely the same 
structures, it turned out, also made Cournot oligopoly more plausible.  Indeed, that is the way the 
subsequent literature read it.  For example, phenomena such as secret price cuts or deviating 
collateral promises in exchange for patronage tended to undermine both express collusion and 
Cournot oligopoly.  For both, however, the dangers increased as the number of firms in the 
market grew smaller. 
Richard Posner, whose principal early contributions on oligopoly and collusion were 
explicitly indebted to Stigler,117 adopted this model, proposing that Stigler’s factors plus some 
additional ones be used as devices for detecting what he termed “tacit” collusion.  This referred 
to cartel-like conduct for which the Sherman Act’s statutory requirements of a “contract, 
combination, . . . or conspiracy” could not be met.118  That is, Posner attempted to bring 
oligopoly theory within §1 of the Sherman Act by seeing it as simply a variation of collusion.  
Just as Stigler, he never cited Cournot.  For antitrust purposes, he argued, oligopoly should be 
viewed as a real, cooperative solution that differed from the classic cartel in that it involved less 
explicit types of communication, as well as inferences that could be drawn from a firm’s 
decisions about production.  Forty years later, Posner conceded that this experiment had largely 
failed.119 
The government’s Merger Guidelines reflect Stigler’s and Posner’s strong initial 
influence that gradually weakened over successive editions.  For example, the 1984 Guidelines, 
written during the high point of neoliberal anti-enforcement bias, spoke of firms that “either 
 
117 Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws:  A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1562 
(1969). 
118 Id. at 1562; for development, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §4.4 (6th ed. 2020).  See in particular §4.4a (discussing the debate between Richard 
Posner and Donald F. Turner on the subject).  On the use of these factors as evidence of a §1 conspiracy, see 6 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶1428-36 (4th ed. 2016). 
119 See Richard A. Posner, Review of Kaplow, Competition and Price Fixing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 761 (2014) 
(reviewing LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING (2013)). 
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explicitly or implicitly coordinate their actions,” or “implicit coordination.”120  The 1992 and 
2010 Merger Guidelines changed this to “coordinated interaction.”121 
Posner did deviate from Stigler in one important way.  He did not deny that firms in a 
concentrated market could reach noncompetitive output reductions and higher prices.  He wrote,  
“[o]ligopolistic interdependence, in short is inherent in the structure of certain markets.  Only 
semantically can it be equated with collusive price-fixing, for it is unresponsive to the remedies 
appropriate in price-fixing cases. . . .”122 
Posner’s biggest issue was not that he denied the existence of oligopoly performance in 
concentrated industries.  He did doubt, however, that there was much that antitrust could do 
about it in the absence of evidence of an agreement.  The approach he suggested was to look for 
the practices that produced stability and adherence and enjoin these where possible.  This was an 
alternative to the proposal offered by his foil Donald F. Turner, who had embraced the oligopoly 
problem in the early 1960s but suggested that there was no good solution within the contours of 
the existing Sherman Act.123  Turner referred to his book with Carl Kaysen, which had proposed 
deconcentration legislation as a remedy.124  The theory was that breaking up firms would lead to 
more players, thus making oligopoly or collusion more difficult to maintain. 
 Robert Bork’s position was more extreme than either Posner’s or Turner’s, although it 
was stated as a naked conclusion rather than as the outcome of any serious analysis.  He was 
simply not persuaded that what he termed “non-collusive oligopolistic behavior” occurred 
anywhere “outside of economics textbooks.”125  Already in the 1960s Bork agreed with the 
Stigler position that the two things that antitrust policy should be concerned about were 
monopoly and collusion, but not intermediate situations such as oligopoly.126  Two decades later 
he was still opining that oligopoly was a “shaky” economic theory: 
The oligopoly theory that once was dominant in antitrust was shaky even then, 
and I would suggest that it never did describe conditions in the real world.  It 
wasn't a change in conditions that undid the oligopoly model; it was the 
 
120 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES §§1.0, 3.11 (1984), https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1984-
merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/R3GL-E7VY]. 
121 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES §2.1 (1992), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1992-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/LVP9-X9EG]. 
122 Posner, supra note 117, at 1565. 
123 Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to 
Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).   
124 See id. at 671 n. 21 (referring to CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 266-72 (1959)). 
125 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 221 (1978).  See also Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 612 (2018) 
(elaborating on Bork’s position). 
126 See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division II, 75 YALE 
L.J. 272, 396 n.52 (1965) (arguing that oligopolists are “not nearly as likely to restrict output as are cartels or 
monopolies”). 
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realization that it was theoretically incoherent and that there was no observable 
market in which its conclusions held good.127 
The passage is insightful mainly because it reveals how little Bork knew about what was 
going on in economics.  In his mind, theories of oligopoly were things that had preoccupied 
economics in the past, but no more.  Even as he was writing, however, the economics of 
industrial organization were going through a theoretical and empirical revolution notable for the 
extent to which models of imperfect competition including oligopoly were displacing perfect 
competition as the governing framework.128 
Today the rejection of Bork’s view in antitrust is robust, but the process of rejection has 
taken a perverse turn to a position more like Turner’s than that of either Stigler or Posner.   
Section One of the Sherman Act is not satisfied by noncooperative oligopoly or even by 
conscious parallelism or signaling content that falls short of agreement.  As a result, the 
argument goes, while collusion-like outcomes or conscious parallelism in markets with many 
firms may be sufficiently suspicious to raise a fact issue of agreement, the same conduct in 
highly concentrated markets for fungible products does not serve to prove a Sherman Act 
agreement at all.  Such outcomes are to be expected simply from the structure of the market.  For 
example, consider this statement from a 2017 Third Circuit decision: 
In non-oligopolistic markets, “[p]arallel behavior among competitors is especially 
probative of price fixing because it is the sine qua non of a price fixing 
conspiracy.” But in an oligopolistic market, parallel behavior “can be a necessary 
fact of life,” and “[a]ccordingly, evidence of conscious parallelism cannot alone 
create a reasonable inference of a conspiracy.” Therefore, to prove an 
oligopolistic conspiracy with proof of parallel behavior, that evidence “must go 
beyond mere interdependence” and “be so unusual that in the absence of an 
advance agreement, no reasonable firm would have engaged in it.”129 
 Far from denying that oligopoly exists except in textbooks, the court is in fact 
acknowledging its existence and explaining why consciously parallel conduct does not prove an 
agreement.    In a concentrated market firms do not need an agreement in order to achieve cartel-
like results. 
The unsettling result is that §1 of the Sherman Act works least well in the markets where 
it is most needed.  This fact is one of the most long-lasting and pervasive false negatives in the 
history of antitrust enforcement.  The tools that we have for dealing with consciously parallel 
behavior among independent actors are and have always been severely limited.  The one place 
 
127 Robert H. Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 21, 25 (1985). 
128 See discussion infra, text at notes 223-251. 
129 Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting, inter alia, In re 
Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2015)). 
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we can do something, even if incomplete, is with a more aggressive merger policy that prohibits 
mergers that threaten to make coordinated interaction more likely.130 
Monopolistic Competition: Stigler and Friedman 
 Stigler’s negative reaction to monopolistic competition was as strong as his negative 
reaction to oligopoly.  Historically, one of the most important differences between the theory of 
oligopoly and that of monopolistic competition is that oligopoly was from the onset a theory 
about how markets for identical products arrive at an equilibrium.  That was one of Cournot’s 
most important original contributions.  By contrast, the firms in Chamberlin’s model were 
always trying to differentiate their products from one another, leading to a “market” of people 
that were actually selling different things.131  Further, in Chamberlin’s own work there was no 
robust theory of market equilibrium, but only the equilibrium of a single firm.  About the best 
Chamberlin could produce was a concept of a “group equilibrium” that was never very well 
explained.132 
Stigler saw this but developed an exaggerated view of its implications for the concept of 
markets.  It led him to doubt that Chamberlin was even talking about goods within a single 
market at all.  As Stigler explained it, the Chamberlin market consisted of “fairly close 
 
130 Posner acknowledged this as a partial solution to the problem.  See Posner, supra note 117, at 1566 noting why 
Donald Turner, the head of the Antitrust Division had supported a prophylactic approach toward mergers: 
 
Since mergers historically have been an important source of concentration, a strong antimerger 
policy should do much to prevent new oligopolies from emerging and loosely oligopolistic 
industries from becoming tightly oligopolistic.  The extraordinary stringency of the Guidelines 
may reflect in part Turner's earlier expressed view that once a market has become highly 
concentrated there is little that can be done under existing law to prevent noncompetitive, 
interdependent pricing. 
 
For a good economic explanation of why we need a more prophylactic policy against horizontal mergers to address 
oligopoly coordination, see Jonathan B. Baker & Joseph Farrell, Oligopoly Coordination, Economic Analysis, and 
the Prophylactic Role of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1985 (2020).  See also Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Prophylactic Merger Policy, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 45 (2018) (providing further explanation of the need for 
prophylactic policy). 
131 As a result, under simple assumptions a firm in monopolistic competition prices at the tangent of its demand 
curve and its long average cost curve and profits will be zero.  See Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with 
Outside Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON. 141, 145 (1979) (explaining firm prices in monopolistic competition).  At that 
point the firm also carries excess capacity.  See Yoram Barzel, Excess Capacity in Monopolistic Competition, 78 J. 
POL. ECON. 1142, 1142 (1970) (discussing excess capacity). 
132 CHAMBERLIN, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 69: 
Monopolistic competition . . . concerns itself not only with the problem of an individual 
equilibrium (the ordinary theory of monopoly), but also with that of a group equilibrium (the 
adjustment of economic forces within a group of competing monopolists, ordinarily regarded 
merely as a group of competitors). 
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substitutes,” but how close is “close”?133  Where does one draw the line of “closeness” so as to 
distinguish two firms in the same market from the situation where one firm is just inside the 
market and one just outside?   As Stigler observed, “[i]t is perfectly possible, on Chamberlin’s 
picture of economic life, that the group contain only one firm, or, on the contrary, that it includes 
all of the firms in the economy.”134  As a result, he concluded, it seemed unlikely that one could 
speak of an equilibrium in a Chamberlin model at all.135  This objection was reflected in the work 
of later scholars who believed that Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis was not really 
possible under monopolistic competition.  Since there was no hard line defining market 
boundaries, economists should use general equilibrium analysis and think of the market as the 
entire economy.136 
Picking up from Stigler, a decade later Milton Friedman continued along the same line, 
querying facetiously whether bulldozers and hairpins should be regarded as differentiated 
products within a single market.  Once we consider product differences as central, the idea of 
markets becomes meaningless.   Just as it is meaningless to speak of a “market” for bulldozers 
and hairpins, so too would it be meaningless to place “two brands of toothpaste” into the same 
market.137  As a result, he concluded, the Chamberlin model for markets offers . . . no stopping 
place between the firm at one extreme and general equilibrium at the other.”138 
What neither Stigler nor Friedman appreciated at the time is that the modeling and 
equilibrium problems could and would be solved.  Further, the precise location of market 
boundaries lost the importance it had had for Marshall and earlier economists.   Today, 
differentiated markets are modeled all the time and can have stable equilibria, as literature since 
the 1970s has developed.139  Even under product differentiation and easy entry, new firms would 
come in until the expected profits from entry (margins multiplied by volume, less costs) were too 
low.  As a result, one can model the size of the market, including the number of firms and even 
the range of diversity.140  The same thing is true of oligopoly in differentiated markets.141 
 
133 George J. Stigler, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in FIVE LECTURES ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 15 
(1949). 
134 Id. at 15. 
135 Id. at 18. 
136 See, e.g., ROBERT TRIFFIN, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY (1940).  For an 
important critique, see RICHARD MARKOVITS, ECONOMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. AND 
E.U. ANTITRUST LAW (2014); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Reimagining Antitrust: The Revisionist Work of 
Richard S. Markovits, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1221 (2016). 
137 Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 1, 39 (1953). 
138 Id. at 39: 
[A]lthough Professor Chamberlin does not state the possibility, it is not even clear that equilibrium is 
attainable: under these vague conditions price may continue to change, and new firms may continue to 
enter and old firms continue to leave the “group.” 
139 See discussion infra, text at notes 236-242. 
140 E.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. 
ECON. REV. 297, 299 (1977) (examining a model reflecting the size of market). 
141 See Shapiro, supra note 76, at 334, 346. 
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 Stigler’s and Friedman’s critique of monopolistic competition observed that the 
traditional idea of distinctive “markets” loses much of its significance when we have to consider 
that products are differentiated, and that some are more differentiated than others.  At the risk of 
making their claims sound frivolous, they were obsessed with the question of how far is far, and 
apparently assumed that there was a natural answer that differentiated product models somehow 
ignored.  When Friedman queried whether the monopolistic competition analysis would put 
bulldozers and hairpins into the same market, he believed he was making a serious critique. 
 
 Both Stigler and Freidman came out of an era when the delineation of distinctive 
“markets” was an essential ingredient of economic analysis.  Under more empirical analysis of 
differentiated producers, however, the concept of the relevant market has become less important, 
and today economists routinely assess market power without knowing or even caring about 
market boundaries. 
 
This empirical shift away from traditional market definition has sometimes escaped 
notice.  For example, in Ohio v. American Express the Supreme Court held that market power 
could not be assessed directly in a case involving a vertical practice but required a market 
definition.142  The Court’s reasoning is not clear, but it concluded that vertical restraints “pose no 
risk to competition unless the entity imposing them has market power, which cannot be 
evaluated unless the Court first defines a relevant market.”143  For that conclusion it quoted a 
statement by Easterbrook that competitive harm can result from vertical arrangements “only if 
there is market power.”144  Notably, Judge Easterbrook did not say that this required a market 
definition.  The Court was simply adopting as a matter of law a retrograde doctrine–in this case a 
false negative that threatens to undermine rational antitrust enforcement.145 
 
Stigler had raised two additional objections to monopolistic competition.  One was that 
depending on the degree of differentiation allowed, the system would tolerate the idea of several 
firms being in the same “market” even though they were “heterogeneous from the technological 
viewpoint.”146  That view migrated into antitrust law just a few years later when the Supreme 
Court, citing Chamberlin’s theory, decided that products as heterogenous as cellophane and tin 
foil could be in the same relevant market simply because some buyers used them interchangeably 
as wrapping materials.147  Both the District Court and the Supreme Court agreed that making one 
 
142 Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
143 Id. at 2285 n.7. 
144 Frank Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L. J. 135, 160 (1984). 
145See discussion infra, text at notes 236-242. 
146 Stigler, supra note 134, at 15. 
147 United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956) (“cellophane”) (“[W]e have 
monopolistic competition in every nonstandardized commodity with each manufacturer having power over the price 
and production of his own product” (citing Chamberlin, supra note 63, Ch. 4)).  For the district court’s lengthy 
discussion, see 118 F. Supp. 41, 51-52 (D. Del. 1953). See also United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 
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product in a monopolistically competitive market did not make one a monopolist – “this power . . 
. is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly.”148  Today the question whether technically 
heterogenous products can be grouped into the same market is empirically addressable and has 
been the subject of significant antitrust literature and litigation.149 
Stigler’s other objection to monopolistic competition theory was that “often, and perhaps 
usually, a large or dominant role is played by firms outside the group in determining prices and 
profits within the group.”150  Two products identified as in the same market could be imperfect 
substitutes, but one product inside and one product just outside a market could be imperfect 
substitutes as well.  What Stigler did not acknowledge is that the problem of porous boundaries 
arises no matter what the model of competition.  To be sure, partial equilibrium analysis employs 
a working assumption that individual markets are insulated from activity that occurs outside the 
market, and vice-versa, but no one really believes that this is true as a matter of fact.151 
The porosity of boundaries is testable, however, and the implications are relevant to 
policy making.  All markets have porous boundaries, but porosity is a question of degree.  For 
example, suppose that in response to an automobile price increase of 5%, one customer in 1000 
substitutes to some other product such as bicycles, walking shoes, or subway tickets.   That 
market would undoubtedly be considered well defined, notwithstanding that 0.1% of customers 
cross the boundary line in response to a price increase. 
In retrospect, Stigler’s and Friedman’s resistance to monopolistic competition derived 
from a notion of markets that depended on physical similarities among products.  In order to deal 
with the problem of monopolistic competition economically, the inter-competitiveness of 
individual firms (cross-elasticity of substitution) had to be quantified.  Physical similarity is one 
kind of evidence of that, but the ultimate test is the extent to which inter-product demand shifts 
in response to price change can hold a firm’s output close to its cost.  A pencil and a fountain pen 
are not in the same market because they look somewhat alike or perform overlapping functions, 
but rather because people will substitute from one to the other as their relative prices change. 
 A market’s size is a function of how high above cost a price must be before excessive 
substitution will result.  Since the 1970s antitrust policy makers have answered that question 
 
453-55 (1964) (lumping metal cans and glass bottles into a single market for merger analysis; noting extent to which 
customers switched between them). 
148 Du Pont, 351 U.S. at 393 (“[O]ne can theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every nonstandardized 
commodity with each manufacturer having power over the price and production of his own product.  However, this 
power . . . is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly.”). 
149 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶539 (5th ed. 2021).  It has also raised the 
issue of whether market distinguishing intellectual property rights such as trademarks can form the basis of market 
definition.  P. Sean Morris, Trademarks as Sources of Market Power: Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, 35 
J. L. & COM. 163 (2017). 
150 Stigler, supra note 134, at 15. 
151 For example, see Oliver E. Williamson’s concession in his well-known paper on antitrust economies that partial 
equilibrium analysis suffers from this “defect,” and as a result “[c]ertain economic effects may . . . go undetected.”  
Importantly, he was speaking of undifferentiated markets.  Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust 
Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 23 (1968). 
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with the “hypothetical monopolist” test.152  The test assumes measurable amounts of 
differentiation, which is the inverse of the cross-elasticity of substitution of supply or demand as 
between two products.153  For example, if the price of bulldozers increases by 5%, which is a 
common assumption for the size of the price increase, how many customers will switch to 
hairpins?  And would that be enough to make the bulldozer increase unprofitable?  We could 
perform the same test with two brands of toothpaste, although with a different result, and we 
would have provided answers for both of Friedman’s examples.154  With good data and a fixed 
assumption about how much of a price increase we want to tolerate, a differentiated market can 
have identifiable boundaries.155  So the questions Friedman was asking in the 1950s are readily 
answerable today, analytically and also empirically, if the relevant information is available.   
Monopolistic competition has migrated from a phenomenon thought to be untestable to one that 
is routinely and robustly tested. 
To illustrate, if the market power of a bicycle manufacturer such as Schwinn were being 
investigated, we might hypothesize a price increase of a given magnitude, say 10% above cost, 
and query how many sales Schwinn would lose.  Suppose it lost 100,000 sales but that 60,000 of 
these went to bicycle seller Giant, while Trek and Fuji received 15,000 each and the remaining 
sales went elsewhere.  If we were evaluating a merger, we might conclude that a merger between 
Schwinn and Giant should be challenged, but not necessarily one between Schwinn and Trek.   
After a Schwinn/Giant merger, many of the sales that Schwinn lost from a price increase would 
be recaptured, making a formerly unprofitable price increase profitable. 
 
 In any event, Stigler was putting the cart in front of the horse.  Already in 1890 Alfred 
Marshall had developed partial equilibrium analysis as a tool for carving out groups of similar 
goods for analysis into a single “market.”  The idea that the goods inside the grouping were 
perfect competitors and that they were completely insulated from goods outside the grouping 
was an important working assumption, but it was no more than that.  Marshall himself realized 
that this was a construct for the purpose of modeling.  As he acknowledged, the forces of 
competition across the entire economy are incomprehensibly broad.  As a result, 
it is best to take a few at a time; and to work out a number of partial solutions as 
auxiliaries to our main study.  Thus we begin by isolating the primary relations of 
supply, demand and price in regard to a particular commodity.  We reduce to 
 
152 See Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 187 (1992), who 
traces the origin of the test to PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 347 (1978).  See also Kenneth D. Boyer, Is There a Principle for 
Defining Industries?, 50 S. ECON. J. 761 (1984) (defining market as “ideal collusive group”).  
153 Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 217 
(1976). 
154 See discussion supra, text at notes 137-138. 
155 On use of the hypothetical monopolist (or cartel) test to delineate a market’s boundaries, see 2B PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶530 (5th ed. 2021).  See also Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. 
Fischer, A Practical Guide to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market Definition, 4 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 1031 
(2008). 
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inaction all other forces by the phrase “other things being equal”: we do not 
suppose that they are inert, but for the time we ignore their activity. This 
scientific device is a great deal older than science:  it is the method by which, 
consciously or unconsciously, sensible men have dealt from time immemorial 
with every difficult problem of ordinary life.156 
Stigler was attempting to turn an important Chamberlin insight about the micro-economy 
into a weakness.  Indeed, today the theoretical and empirical ability to quantify the degree to 
which close substitutes compete with each other has become an important tool of antitrust 
analysis.157  Further, the question of where the boundary of a “market” is does more harm than 
good.   For this reason, “direct” measures of market power from residual demand elasticities do 
not require a market definition.158 
 For Stigler, the theory of monopolistic competition did not permit a conception of a 
market with a multifirm equilibrium.   As a result, it was no more than a special case of 
monopoly: 
The general contribution of the theory of monopolistic competition . . . has led to 
reorientation and refinement of our thinking on monopoly. We are now more 
careful to pay attention to the logical niceties of definitions of industries and 
commodities. We are now more careful to apply monopoly theory where it is 
appropriate. The importance of the trademark and of advertising, and the need for 
study of product structure and evolution, have become more generally 
recognized.159 
Stigler did not appreciate the very real problems about the modern economy that the 
model of monopolistic competition was much better at addressing.  For example, under the 
theory of perfect competition that Stigler favored, the cross-elasticity of substitution (whether of 
demand or supply) between two goods in the same market is infinitely high, while that of a good 
inside the market and another good outside the market is zero.   Historically, Cournot theory 
made the same assumption; a firm considered the output of firms making the “same” product in 
estimating its own residual demand, but not the output of firms that made something different. 
The theory of monopolistic competition challenged this view by positing an economy in 
which the cross elasticity of substitution between two goods falls between these extremes and 
varies from one pairing to another.  In the process it modelled an economy much more like the 
one we actually live in.  Goods have closer and more remote substitutes.  For example, a Toyota 
Corolla may be an imperfect substitute for both a Chevrolet Malibu and a Jaguar XE, but the 
elasticity of substitution is very likely much different.  The obvious questions about such 
observations are whether 1) they are provably true; and 2) whether there are any testable policy 
implications.  On the second point, we might define a “market” that includes all three vehicles 
 
156 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, xiv (8th ed. 1920) (emphasis added). 
157 See discussion infra, text at notes 233-238. 
158 See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶521 (5th ed. 2021). 
159 George J. Stigler, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in FIVE LECTURES ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 144 
(1949). 
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because all compete to some degree.  Or we might define an alternative market for, say, 
“standard” (as opposed to luxury) automobiles, that excludes the Jaguar.  Today we have tools 
for doing that, but using them still requires a decision about just how much substitution must 
occur before two goods will be placed into the same market. 
When products are differentiated any antitrust market definition is always strictly wrong.  
To the extent it groups differentiated goods into the same market it tends to understate power by 
treating as perfectly competitive things that are not so.  To the extent it excludes imperfect 
substitutes it tends to exaggerate power because it treats such goods as if they do not compete at 
all. 
 
Stigler conceded the descriptive fact of differentiation, using the New York housing 
market as an example.160.`  The available offerings ranged from “incredible estates to 
unbelievable slums,” randomly distributed.  “Every unit is unique in a rigorous technological 
sense. . . .”161  He observed that using such observations made it difficult to identify “markets” at 
all.  This indeterminate concept of the market meant for Stigler that monopolistic competition 
allowed no conception of an equilibrium.  
That observation was crucial for Stigler’s critique because he believed that the theory of 
monopolistic competition made it impossible to speak sensibly about “markets” at all.162  Stigler 
did not pursue this observation into antitrust, where it might have permitted a finding of 
“monopoly” on much narrower markets, even single brand markets in some cases.163 
 Stigler then offered an evaluation of monopolistic competition’s contribution to economic 
science, similar to Friedman’s positivistic approach to economics a decade later: 
The purpose of the study of economics is to permit us to make predictions about 
the behavior of economic phenomena under specified conditions.  The sole test of 
the usefulness of an economic theory is the concordance between its predictions 
and the observable course of events.  Often a theory is criticized or rejected 
 
160 George J. Stigler, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in GEORGE J. STIGLER, FIVE LECTURES ON ECONOMIC 
PRINCIPLES 131 (1949). 
161 Id. at 132. 
162 Id. at 144.  He added: 
We are now more careful to pay attention to the logical niceties of definitions of industries and 
commodities. We are now more careful to apply monopoly theory where it is appropriate. The 
importance of the trademark and of advertising, and the need for study of product structure and 
evolution, have become more generally recognized. These and other improvements may seem 
disappointing to the hopeful proposers of a proud new theory, but they should not be. This is the 
way sciences grow. One of the prominent lessons of the history of human thought is that new 
ideas do not lead to the abandonment of the previous heritage; the new ideas are swallowed up by 
the existing corpus, which is thereafter a little different.  And sometimes a little better. 
163 E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476, n.22 (1992) (permitting single brand 
market, noting relevance of monopolistic competition); Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 3d 817, 837 
(N.D. Cal. 2020) (speaking of monopolistic competition in addressing claims of a single-brand market).  Chamberlin 
anticipated some of this.  See Edward H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 
(PAPERS & PROC.) 85 (1950) (anticipating existence of monopolies in single brand markets).  
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because its assumptions are 'unrealistic'.  Granting for a moment that this charge 
has meaning, it burdens theory with an additional function, that of description.  
This is a most unreasonable burden to place upon a theory:  the role of description 
is to particularize, while the role of theory is to generalize - to disregard an 
infinite number of differences and capture the important common element in 
different phenomena.164 
 
This defense of testability as the key to science did not so much anticipate Friedman as 
reflect both Stigler’s and Friedman’s experiences in the Mont Pelerin society, where Friedman in 
particular was very taken with the scientific positivism of fellow Mont Pelerin member Karl 
Popper.165 
 
 To Stigler, the theory of monopolistic competition was largely useless to economic 
science.  While it could tell descriptive stories about such phenomena as the diversified New 
York housing market, it could not offer useful predictions.  He ignored monopolistic competition 
in his otherwise important book on price theory.166 
 
Stigler failed to foresee that given adequate data even the highly differentiated New York 
City housing market could be subjected to empirical competitive analysis.  It could predict, for 
example, that a merger of two similar and adjacent high rise apartment buildings in New York 
would have a more measurable impact on prices than a merger of one apartment building and 
one single family mansion a half mile away.  In fact, today that kind of merger analysis is the 
rule rather than the exception.167   It is based on the simple premise that the amount of product 
differentiation between two goods is testable and can yield useful predictions about the impact of 
such substitution on price.168 
 
 Friedman’s well known essay on positive economics also argued that the value of an 
economic theory is its testability, not its descriptive verisimilitude.169  Indeed, he is largely 
credited with importing positivistic scientific methodology into economics.170  As with Stigler, 
 
164 STIGLER, supra note 160, at 23. 
165 See ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE THE DEPRESSION 160 (2012) 
(describing relationship between Friedman and Popper). 
166 GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE (3d ed. 1966). 
167 See 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶914 (4th ed. 2018) (describing unilateral 
post-merger price increases in product differentiated markets). 
168 E.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm, 
6 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 283 (1988) (quantifying product differentiation as the inverse of the cross elasticity of 
demand as between two brands; applying it to the differentiated beer industry). 
169 MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 1, 1-47 (1953). [ed, this can be hard to find; I have a scanned .pdf if you want it.HH] 
170 See William J. Frazer, Jr. & Lawrence A. Boland, An Essay on the Foundations of Friedman’s Methodology, 73 
AM. ECON. REV. 129 (1983) (alluding in part to Friedman’s use of positivistic scientific methodology into 
economics).  See also Lawrence A. Boland, Current View on Economic Positivism, in COMPANION TO 
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he was particularly critical of monopolistic competition theory because he believed it provided 
no mechanism for assessing how far apart in product space two products must be before they 
should be placed in different markets.171  He elaborated: 
 
The deficiencies of the theory are revealed most clearly in its treatment of, 
or inability to treat, problems involving groups of firms-Marshallian "industries."  
So long as it is insisted that, differentiation of product is essential - and it is the 
distinguishing feature of the theory that it does insist on this point - the definition 
of an industry in terms of firms producing an identical product cannot be used.  
By that definition each firm is a separate industry.  Definition in terms of "close" 
substitutes or a "substantial" gap in cross-elasticities evades the issue, introduces 
fuzziness and undefinable terms into the abstract model where they have no place, 
and serves only to make the theory analytically meaningless….172 
 
As a result, he concluded: 
 
It is therefore incompetent to contribute to the analysis of a host of important 
problems:  the one extreme is too narrow to be of great interest; the other, too 
broad to permit meaningful generalizations.173 
 
 Given the empirical revolution that occurred in the 1970s and after, today Stigler’s and 
Friedman’s comments seem quaint, dated, and in all events wrong.  Limited by the theory and 
econometric tools of their day, however, the theory of monopolistic competition offered little in 
the way of testable results.  Paul Samuelson’s observation in 1967 that monopolistic competition 
was not yet testable but probably could be was far more realistic as of that time.174  He 
anticipated the very significant developments in testability of monopolistic competition that 
subsequently occurred.175 
 
CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC THOUGHT 88, 88 (David Greenaway et al ed., 1991) (emphasizing the pervasiveness of 
economic positivism).  
171 See, e.g, FRIEDMAN, supra note 169, at 39 n.34 (rejecting attempts to classify elasticity pairs as “large” or “small” 
and define markets on that basis, referring to R. L. Bishop, Elasticities, Cross-Elasticities, and Market 
Relationships, 42 AM. ECON. REV. 779 (1952)). 
172 FRIEDMAN, Methodology, supra note 172 at 38. 
173 Id. at 39. 
174 Paul A. Samuelson, The Monopolistic Competition Revolution, in MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION THEORY, 105, 
108 n.5 (Robert E. Kuenne ed., 1967). 
175 See discussion infra, text at notes 234-238; e.g, Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stieglitz, Monopolistic 
Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977); see Steven Brakman & Ben J. 
Heijdra, Introduction to  THE MONOPOLISTIC REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT (Steven Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra eds., 
2002) (discussing in part the monopolistic competition revolution started by Dixit and Stieglitz); John C. Panzar & 
James N. Rosse, Testing for “Monopoly” Equilibrium, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 443 (1987) (developing testable models 
of monopolistic competition). 
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Markets and Equilibrium Under Imperfect Competition 
 
 Both Stigler and Friedman depicted equilibrium as easy and intuitive for perfectly 
competitive markets, but not for differentiated ones.  In addition to being wrong about 
monopolistic competition, they also seriously understated the difficulties that economists 
including Marshall had encountered in developing a usable theory of equilibrium even for 
undifferentiated industries.  For Marshall, the fly in the ointment was fixed costs.  Under perfect 
competition, which Marshall assumed, prices will be driven to marginal costs, without enough 
remaining to cover fixed costs.  Further, fixed costs entail that per unit costs that decline as 
output increases.  So why does a single firm that becomes larger than the others not end up 
taking over the entire market, leading to permanent monopoly?  This fixed-cost controversy 
haunted not only the economics literature but also antitrust policy in its early years, leading to 
such things as the “ruinous competition” defense to collusion in industries with high fixed costs.  
The argument was that in such industries as the railroads competition would drive prices below 
total costs and only collusion or merger would save them.  Competition would not work in 
industries with high fixed costs.  This battle raged in economics from the beginning of the 
twentieth century until the 1930s.176 
 
 Marshall himself had addressed the problem by developing the essentially biological idea 
of the “representative” firm, which was similar to but also distinctive from other firms in the 
market.177  Marshall used the analogy of the representative tree in a forest.  Some trees are 
younger and still growing.   Others are mature and about to die.  As a result, the identity of the 
representative tree changes over time while the forest as a whole always retains its general 
characteristics.  Because of this natural life cycle, no one acquires a permanent monopoly.  
Individuals move gradually into their strongest positions and then gradually fade out until they 
die. 
 
While the “representative” firm idea failed as a durable economic concept, Marshall did 
point the debate in one unalterable direction:  the way to get a stable equilibrium at the market 
level is to uncover relevant differences among firms.  Marshall’s biological cycling story was 
 
176 The controversy is recounted in HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 308-22 
(1991). 
177 The theory, as well as subsequent refinements by Arthur C. Pigou and Ronald Coase, is explored further in 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499, 537-39 
(2011). 
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one, but others resorted to other differentiating attributes, including spatial separation,178 
changing costs,179 and price discrimination180 as well as product differentiation.181 
 
 The theory of monopolistic competition provided a solution that largely ended the debate:  
equilibrium is possible because individual firms in fact face slightly different demand curves.  
They are able to survive even with fixed costs because their customer base is not quite the same 
as the customer base of their rivals.  As a result, equilibrium is possible even in the presence of 
fixed costs and prices higher than marginal cost.182 
The Meaning and Scope of Entry Barriers 
The anti-enforcement version of the error-cost theory depended strongly on one very 
general assumption that had always guided classical economics:  entry by new firms would 
discipline any existing firm’s attempt to charge more than a competitive price.  Judge 
Easterbrook expressed it in his opening declaration that “[m]onopoly is self-destructive.  
Monopoly prices eventually attract entry.”183  He acknowledged that in some situations entry 
might be a “long time coming,” but that should not obscure the main point–markets discipline 
monopoly pricing by bringing in new sellers.184  An important premise of the error cost 
jurisprudence is that entry barriers are generally low.185 
Prior to the 1930s, economists did not think systematically about the conditions 
encouraging or discouraging market entry.  Alfred Marshall never mentioned them in the nearly 
1000 pages of his Principles.186  He assumed that entry was easy and would occur as long as 
profits were anticipated.  Entry would stop when there was no remaining margin between 
anticipated prices and anticipated costs, and only for that long.  By contrast, monopoly was 
usually analyzed on the assumption that entry was impossible, or simply not in prospect.  When 
the classical political economists became angry about entry barriers it was almost always about 
government-created restrictions such as patents or other exclusive rights, corporate charters, or 
 
178 E.g., Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929) (exploring differential consumer 
preferences under spatial dispersion); Abba P. Lerner & Hans W. Singer, Some Notes on Duopoly and Spatial 
Competition, 45 J. POL. ECON. 145 (1937) (exploring the effects of special dispersion on competition). 
179 Arthur C. Pigou, An Analysis of Supply, 38 ECON. J. 238 (1928) (explaining that firms whose marginal costs are 
higher than industry supply price will shrink while those whose marginal costs are lower will grow). 
180 JOHN M. CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923). 
181 CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63. 
182 For good discussion of the role of monopolistic competition in settling the fixed cost controversy, see MARK 
BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 375-79 (5th ed. 1996). 
183 Easterbrook, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2. 
184 Easterbrook, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2. 
185 See Bryan & Hovenkamp, supra note 52 (addressing concerns in competition and innovation as a result of startup 
acquisitions). 
186 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (8th ed. 1920).  The only reference to new entry was in his 
preface, and described industries that “offer[] an open field for new firms which rise to the first rank, and perhaps 
after a time decay. . . .”  Id. at xiii. 
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occupational licensing restrictions.187  In those cases they usually associated entry restraints with 
monopoly.188 
These assumptions largely held true for Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlin as well.  
The theory of monopolistic competition assumed easy entry.  Joan Robinson’s Economics of 
Imperfect Competition explicitly acknowledged that perfect competition required easy entry, but 
the only entry barriers she ever mentioned were government restrictions.189  In one prescient 
footnote she acknowledged that the study of the “conditions influencing the entry of new firms” 
is “an interesting and largely unexplored field of inquiry.”190 
 The idea of economic barriers to market entry other than explicit public or private 
restrictions appeared in the antitrust case law before it was systematized by economists.  As early 
as its 1911 American Tobacco decision, the Supreme Court criticized aggregations of capital that 
served “as perpetual barriers to the entry of others into the tobacco trade.”191  In a pessimistic and 
often exaggerated book published in 1936, Columbia University economist Arthur R. Burns 
frequently lamented the fact that entry into some markets was difficult and costly, in part because 
prospective entrants had to consider the fact that in response to their own entry prices would fall 
even further.  As a result, they were inclined to stay away.192 
The more centrist Harvard School economist Joe S. Bain studied the issue systematically 
in the 1950s and 1960s and remains the most significant theoretician of the subject.  He 
developed an influential and enforcement-neutral definition of entry barriers that is dominant to 
this day.  An entry barrier is some factor that excludes new entrants from a market even as 
monopoly profits are being earned.  More technically, entry barriers measure “the degree to 
which established firms can elevate their selling prices above minimal average costs while 
forestalling entry.”193  That definition is enforcement-neutral because it makes no a priori 
judgment about the quality or necessity of a barrier to entry in a particular case but is dedicated 
only to determining empirically whether a barrier exists.  Bain found commonly given factors 
 
187 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 
149-50 (1989) (discussing frustration of classical economists with government-based market restrictions). 
188 Id; Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: A Legal and Social 
Study, 53 CAL. L. REV. 487, 494-502 (1965). 
189 See, e.g., JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 93, 250, 283-84 (2d ed. 1969). 
190 Id. at 92 n.1. 
191 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 183, 190 (1911).  See also United States v. U.S. Steel 
Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 456-57 (1920) (describing how the tobacco trust excluded new entrants by buying firms up and 
shutting them down); United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 F. 62, 75 (W.D.N.Y. 1915) (same; repeated 
acquisitions).  Under state antitrust law, see, e.g., Needles v. Bishop & Babock Co., 14 Ohio Dec. 445, 1904 WL 
1209 (Ohio C.P. 1904) (exclusionary agreement covering plumbing supplies). 
192 ARTHUR ROBERT BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION: A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 
141, 409, 470 (1936). 
193 JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 268 (1968).  See also JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: 
THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956) (first introducing this definition of 
entry barriers). 
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such as economies of scale and fixed costs to be entry barriers,194 but he also found barriers in 
product differentiation and vertical integration.195  Further, these barriers excluded even equally 
efficient rivals.  The first set of merger guidelines, issued by the Justice Department in 1968, 
emphasized the point about vertical integration.  They concluded that large vertical mergers “will 
usually raise entry barriers or disadvantage competitors to an extent not accounted for by, and 
wholly disproportionate to, such economies as may result from the merger.”196 
In his quest to shore up perfect competition models, Stigler built an anti-enforcement bias 
into his alternative definition of an entry barrier:  an entry barrier is “a cost of producing (at some 
or every rate of output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not 
borne by firms already in the industry.”197 
The Stigler definition’s anti-enforcement bias is that it tends to reward incumbents if the 
entry risk attaches to novelty or small size.  Because every firm was once new and small, these 
were costs that it also had to overcome.  For example, a firm that already has a well-recognized 
brand name faces a lower cost of maintaining consumer awareness or growing new business than 
a new and unknown firm.  As a result, the new firm will have to spend resources acquiring name 
recognition that the established firm does not.  Economies of scale operate the same way.  A firm 
that is entering a new market starts out at a low level of output, which will give it higher unit 
production costs until it gets its output up.  During that early period it will operate at a cost 
disadvantage to an established larger firm.  Because all firms had to encounter these costs when 
they entered, they did not count as entry barriers under Stigler’s definition. 
One defense offered for Stigler’s position is that it attempts to distinguish between desirable 
and undesirable entry barriers.  There is nothing inherently undesirable about name brand 
recognition or economies of scale.  But this loses sight of an important point, which is that 
antitrust does not condemn entry barriers as such.  Rather, they are simply a mechanism for 
considering whether the durable exercise of monopoly power is possible.  The defendant must 
still have engaged in a collusive or exclusionary practice.198 
 
194 Bain’s position was basically that economies of scale were an entry barrier, and that plant size in many industries 
was much greater than needed to attain all available economies. See JOE S. BAIN, PRICING, DISTRIBUTION AND 
EMPLOYMENT 178-79 (1948) (discussing factors that act as barriers to competitive markets). 
195 BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION, supra note 193, at 142-43, 212.  On Bain and vertical integration in 
particular, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880-1960, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 863 (2010).  On the perceived relationship between vertical integration and monopolistic competition, see 
Morris A. Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REV. 27 (1949). 
196 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES 9-10 (1968), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf. [https://perma.cc/CB57-N4JT].  
197 GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968). On the relative merits of alternative 
definitions, see Dennis W. Carlton, Barriers to Entry, 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION L. & POL. 601 (2008). 
198 For this reason, some prominent economists prefer the Bain definition.  See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee, Sunk 
Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry, 94 AM. ECON. REV., PAPER & PROC. 471, 474 (2004) (concluding that “[t]he 
Stigler definition has no useful role to play in analysis of the ability of entry to force post-merger price reductions.  
All this is broadly consistent with the Bain definition. . . .”). 
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For example, suppose the fear in a market is oligopoly pricing among three large firms with 
significant fixed costs and scale economies.  It is hardly useful to point out that economies of 
scale are not a qualifying barrier to entry, so no need to worry.  To the contrary, in this case the 
economies of scale create the protected space in which the three large firms can coordinate their 
pricing without worrying about new entry.  The price coordination, not the scale economies, is 
the appropriate enforcement target. 
Bain and Stigler both wrote prior to the rise of a significant economic theory of networks 
and network externalities, but the same argument applies there.  One of the most important entry 
barriers in digital network platforms is a large installed basis.199  “Direct” network effects imply 
that the network is more valuable to users as their number increases.   “Indirect” network effects 
imply that the network is more valuable on one side as the number of participants on the other 
side increases.  The Uber ride hailing app is an example that involves both types of externalities.  
Uber becomes more valuable as the number of drivers increases, but the increase in drivers will 
also provoke an increase in riders.  As a result, a large, well established ride hailing network will 
have a significant advantage over a new network trying to break into the market.200 
Under the Bainian definition these network effects would be an entry barrier if the result 
was that a large well-established network could earn returns above the competitive level while 
yet deterring a new entrant.  By contrast, under the Stigler definition we would have to conclude 
that entry barriers were lacking because the new network would have to incur the same costs that 
the incumbent had to incur when it first entered the market. 
 The early to mid-eighties, when “The Limits of Antitrust” was written, was the high point 
of entry barrier skepticism.  Prominent economists at the time were arguing that entry 
possibilities could alleviate many of our concerns about monopoly, even in public utility and 
other natural monopoly markets that were thought to have room for only a single firm.  Firms 
could still be made to compete to be that firm if the state simply set up suitable auctions.  For 
example, if delivery of cable television is a natural monopoly, a bidding competition could be 
 
199 See, e.g, Steven C. Salop, Dominant Digital Platforms: Is Antitrust Up to the Task?, 130 YALE L.J. FORUM 563 
(2021) (examining exclusionary tactics by the dominant platforms); Peter Lee, Innovation Consolidation, 54 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 967 (2020) (arguing that commercializing patented technologies leads to consolidation).  See also 
Gregory J. Werden, Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 
87 (2001) (assessing how network effects can present a barrier to entry). 
200 The phenomenon has been noted in the antitrust case law.  See SC Innovations, Inc. v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 18-
cv-07440-JCS, 2020 WL 2097611 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2020) (speaking of the “ride-hailing 
market's barriers to entry—in particular, network effects caused by passengers preferring a platform with a large 
supply of drivers and drivers preferring a platform with a large supply of passengers. . . .”).  In general, network 
effects exclude entry to the extent that significant product differentiation is impossible, as it might well be for ride-
hailing services.  Where significant differentiation is possible–say, for Facebook or another social networking site–
then new entry can occur.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE L.J. 1952, 1996-
2000 (2021) (discussing market dynamics that lead to high user bases for tech platforms). 
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designed to select the carrier, and the winning bid would be a competitive price.201  In their 1982 
book on Contestable Markets202 Baumol, Panzar, and Willig proclaimed contestable market 
theory to be an “uprising” in industrial organization economics.203 
The theory of contestable markets made important contributions to our knowledge about 
industry structure in markets with very high and nonrecoverable fixed costs.  However, it was 
never an uprising, and the economy has never yet experienced widespread abandonment of 
regulation of natural monopolies in favor of franchise bidding to be the monopolist.204 
 Easterbrook incorporated the Stigler definition of entry barriers into his error cost 
analysis, defining entry barriers as “costs borne by the new firms that were not borne by the 
existing ones. . . .”205  By using this definition he was able to propose a “filter,” which is that if a 
practice has persisted for a significant length of time–he suggested five years–and the firms have 
not “substantially lost market position,” then the challenge should be dismissed.206  Interestingly, 
more centrist Harvard School scholars Areeda and Turner suggested the virtually opposite 
presumption, which also never became law.  As part of their limited proposal for “no fault” 
monopolization, they argued that monopoly that had persisted at least five years should be 
challenged, with breakup as a remedy, without proof of an exclusionary practice.207 
In any event, neither presumption is a good idea.  Economies of scale and network effects 
do not work that way.  Under constant technology they can be very durable, lasting significantly 
longer than five years.  A large firm, or a firm with a large installed base, could retain a 
significant advantage over new entrants into the indefinite future, but the Easterbrook rule would 
effectively insulate it from a rule of reason antitrust offense.  Every monopolist or cartel would 
love to be able to take advantage of a rule that legalized it after five years of operation without 
 
201 E.g., Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968) (arguing that traditional 
understandings of competition have led to incorrect analyses of the asserted relationship between market 
concentration and competition). 
202 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).  For 
pushback, see Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies – In General and With Respect to 
CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976) and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Technological Change, Sunk Costs, and Competition 3 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 883 (1987), https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/technological-
change-sunk-costs-and-competition/ [https://perma.cc/2VE2-FK4Z]. 
203 See William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1 (1982) (asserting that a description such as “uprising” is more indicative of the dynamics of contestable 
markets). 
204 The theory exhibited some important conceptual flaws.  For example, it required an assumption of constant 
returns to scale, which meant that there could not be monopoly in the first place.  See generally Martin L. Weitzman, 
Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure: Comment, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 486 (1983) 
(discussing application of the concept of of contestability). 
205 Easterbrook, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 33. 
206 Id. 
207 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶623c (1978).  I have kept the original Areeda-
Turner Proposal intact for purposes of reference, but with my own objections. 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶638d (5th ed. 2021). 
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new entry.  By contrast, the Areeda-Turner proposal would presume that long resistance to entry 
signals competitive harm.  But it could as easily show efficient firm behavior in a market with 
substantial entry impediments.  The better rule for entry barriers is that they be enforcement 
neutral.  That is, they make durable monopoly possible but exclusionary practices must still be 
proven. 
Efficiencies and the Welfare-Tradeoff Model 
 The welfare-tradeoff model of antitrust analysis, championed by Oliver Williamson and 
later popularized by Robert Bork, purported to evaluate a merger or other antirust practice by 
comparing its welfare losses against its efficiency benefits, or cost savings.  This model 
dominated during the 1970s and early 1980s when the focus of antitrust policy was less on 
achieving high output and more on producing profits. 
 
In a well-known paper on efficiency-creating mergers Williamson analyzed the problem using 
the figure below.208  It illustrates a merger that produces a deadweight loss of A1 and cost savings 
of A2.  That deadweight loss estimate, it should be noted, represents the minimum estimate that 
has been used to estimate the social cost of monopoly.209  In Williamson’s model, if the cost 
savings rectangle (reduced cost per unit times output) is larger than the deadweight loss triangle 
the merger is efficient.  Williamson observed that this was a partial equilibrium model,210 and he 
acknowledged that it was isolating one sector out of the economy.211  However, the particular 
partial equilibrium model that he was illustrating was that of a monopoly–more precisely, of a 
merger that carried a market from competition to monopoly. 
 
208 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).  
See BORK, supra note 56, at 21, 107 (showing a figure resembling Williamson’s). 
209 See discussion supra, text at notes 43-44. 
210 Williamson, supra note 206, at 21. 
211 Williamson, supra note 206, at 21. 
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The distinctive feature of a monopoly is that both the cost savings and the welfare loss 
are spread across the same market.  In the case of monopoly, that means they are also spread 
across a single firm.  The same thing is true of unilateral effects mergers, where only the merging 
parties experience the price increase.212  However, these merger effects were not yet known at 
the time Williamson was writing and he did not address them.  The figure assumes that both the 
deadweight losses and the cost savings reflect the price effects and efficiency effects of a single 
firm. 
 
 While a merger to monopoly would be unlawful, the vast majority of mergers challenged 
on collusion-facilitating grounds fall far short of that.  Further, when collusion or other 
coordinated behavior occurs, it typically permits all firms in the market to raise their price.  That 
clearly applies to cartel members, but even nonmembers will be able to ride up on the cartel 
price.213  In the orthodox example, a merger that reduces a market from, say, five to four firms, 
will enable all four to increase their prices.  The efficiency gains from a merger, by contrast, are 
productive efficiency gains that typically accrue only to the post-merger firm itself. 
 
 
212 See DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 29, at § 6 (explaining that “[a] merger between firms selling differentiated 
products may diminish competition by enabling the merged firm to profit by unilaterally raising the price of one or 
both products above the pre-merger level”). 
213 This gives rise to the theory of “umbrella” pricing, which considers whether firms who purchase from 
competitors of a cartel should have standing to sue the cartel when the competitors are able to ride their own prices 
up on the cartel price increase.  See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 347 (5th ed. 
2021). 
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Consider what happens in the case of a merger that creates a post-merger firm with a 
market share in the range of 30%-40%.  Under the current Merger Guidelines,214 many collusion 
facilitating mergers in that range could be challenged.  For example, suppose a pre-merger 
market has firms of A=40%, B=30%, C=15%, and D=15%.  A merger of C and D would yield a 
market with a post-merger HHI of 3400,215 and an HHI increase of 450, very far above the 
threshold for presumptive challenge.216  The higher prices will occur in the entire market–that is, 
both the merging firm and its rivals will reduce output and increase their prices.  However, the 
increased efficiencies would ordinarily be specific to the firm, whose output accounts for only 
30% of the market.  In this case, the welfare losses that result could be more than three times 
larger than Williamson’s estimate.  Coupled with the fact that the welfare-tradeoff model 
approves mergers even when output is lower (from Q1 to Q2 in the figure) and prices are higher 
as a result, the model injected a strong anti-enforcement bias into merger law that served to 
protect output reducing mergers.  Further, neither Williamson nor Bork explained how practices 
that reduced output so significantly could yet be efficient.217 
 
The government’s 1984 Merger Guidelines contained a generous accommodation of 
efficiencies without limitation.  They required in a brief statement only that efficiencies be 
established by clear and convincing evidence.218  Subsequent editions of the Guidelines 
gradually moved back to a more demanding position.  The 1992 Guidelines added to this that the 
government would not challenge a merger “reasonably necessary to achieve significant net 
efficiencies.”219  In 1997, however, the Agencies issued a significant revision of the 1992 
Guidelines, largely limited to a discussion of efficiencies.  By that time the tide had shifted.  
Without much fanfare the 1997 Revision rejected the welfare tradeoff model in favor of one that 
is more closely aligned with our conception of consumer welfare today.  An efficiency would be 
recognized only if it was “sufficient to reverse the merger's potential to harm consumers in the 
relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.”220  This formulation was 
restated in the 2010 Merger Guidelines.221 
 
214 See DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 29, at § 5.3 (discussing market concentration evaluation).   
215 The HHI, or Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is the sum of the squares of the market shares of every firm in a 
market.  For example, a market with four equal size firms would have an HHI of 252 X 4 (625 X 4) = 2500.  On the 
HHI and its properties, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 33, at § 12.4a. 
216 See DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 29, at § 5.3 (noting that this merger would fall within the range of highly 
concentrated markets, where an HHI increase in the range of 100 to 200 points would presumptively be challenged). 
217 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, __ WASH. U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), currently 
available at file:///C:/Users/herbe/Downloads/SSRN-id3771399%20(18).pdf.   
218 See DEP’T OF JUST., 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.5 (1984), https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1984-merger-
guidelines [https://perma.cc/TXJ4-PWCF] (explaining how the Department of Justice examines efficiencies). 
219 DEP’T OF JUST., 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (1992), https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1992-merger-
guidelines [https://perma.cc/L24D-BG4S]. 
220 DEP’T OF JUST., 1997 MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1997-merger-
guidelines [https://perma.cc/YAY3-QL6Y]. 
221 DEP’T OF JUST., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (08/19/2010) § 10 (2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 [https://perma.cc/S8EA-QQJV]. 
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That change rejected an anti-enforcement bias that permitted a merger (or other practice) 
to be approved as welfare positive even if it reduced output and raised prices.222  Rejecting that 
principle was an important step in getting antitrust to adopt a true policy of favoring higher 
output and lower prices. 
THE EMPIRICAL REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS 
 
Stigler’s and Friedman’s complaint that monopolistic competition is not a part of 
economic science because it does not produce testable predictions is outdated and seems quaint 
today.  Given the lack of theory and significant shortcomings in empirical methodology, 
however, it was not so in the 1940s and 1950s.  Thanks to Friedman’s overpowering stature, 
economic historian Jan Keppler observes, monopolistic competition was simply not considered 
to be a very promising subject of research.223  A particular deterrent was Friedman’s conclusion 
that monopolistic theory provided no equilibrium beyond that of a single firm.224 
 
 A vast amount of subsequent work largely corrected these views, all the while revealing 
severe shortcomings in models of perfect competition.  In 1987, a little after Easterbrook’s error 
cost paper was published, Timothy Bresnahan and Richard Schmalensee hosted an important 
symposium on “The Empirical Renaissance in Industrial Economics.”225  They used the term 
“renaissance” to refer to important empirical work done mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, although 
some of it stretched earlier.  They briefly examined older work defending Stigler’s attempts to 
preserve the Marshall model, while noting that historically there was “little explicit modeling of 
imperfect competition.”226  They also noted that empirical studies of industries had begun with a 
“case study” approach that focused on specific industries of firms,227 and then moved to “cross-
section” econometric studies which compared different variables with each other and produced 
propositions that could be tested empirically, soon after through the use of regression analysis.228 
 
222 Hovenkamp, supra note 215. 
223 Jan Horst Keppler, The Genesis of ‘Positive Economics’ and the Rejection of Monopolistic Competition Theory: 
A Methodological Debate, 22 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 261, 264 (1998).  
224 This presumed failure, Keppler observes, made monopolistic competition theory particularly useless for 
macroeconomics, where the search for a general equilibrium theory was one of economics’ most exciting fields.  Id. 
at 273. 
225 Timothy F. Bresnahan & Richard Schmalensee, The Empirical Renaissance in Industrial Economics: An 
Overview, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 371, 371 (1987).  
226 Id. at 372. 
227 E.g., D.H. WALLACE, MARKET CONTROL IN THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY (1937) (presenting a case study of the 
aluminum industry).  The “case study” approach dominated industrial organization from the 1910s through the 
1930s, particularly at Harvard, although it remains a staple of many business schools today.  See Hovenkamp, supra 
note 185, at 110-14 (discussing the rising popularity of case studies). 
228 E.g., Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1988) (listing one such study); Richard 
Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1988) (same); Leonard Weiss, Quantitative Studies of Industrial 
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In the 1970s came much more formal technical analysis of imperfectly competitive 
markets.229  As Bresnahan and Schmalensee noted, a characteristic of this work is that it stressed 
“systematic statistical analysis rather than anecdotes”230–i.e., it met the Stigler/Friedman 
requirements of testability.  Part of this new movement was innovations in data set construction, 
facilitated by great improvements in computer technology and which enabled economists to 
break free from the use of census data that had never done a good job of dividing the territory in 
competitively meaningful ways.231  “[I]n a departure from the earlier traditions,” they observed, 
“the tools of imperfect competition theory are now routinely used” to create and test economic 
models.232  As noted previously, the use of the phrase “imperfect competition” at this time was 
not a particular reference to Joan Robinson’s book with that title.  Rather, it referred to models 
that blended oligopoly theory, product differentiation, and concerns about entry barriers. 
 
The various studies that Bresnahan and Schmalensee included233 exhibited these 
developments, and empirical work in imperfectly competitive markets accelerated from that 
point.  A broad range of studies began to pursue questions about the exercise of market power, 
whether unilateral or collaborative, in imperfectly competitive markets.234  Many of these 
produced robust empirical results that were flatly inconsistent with Stiglerian models of perfect 
competition.  In the process, they undermined the Marshall/Stigler idea of industrial structure 
that the landscape consisted of discrete product markets with hard lines between them. 
 
Instead, the range of differential elasticities among competing firms that Stigler and 
Friedman had ridiculed became a subject of intense study.  The new work rejected on empirical 
grounds the idea of a “market” as a grouping of products whose cross elasticity of demand or 
 
Organization, in FRONTIERS OF QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS (M.D. Intriligator ed., 1981) (same).  For later work, see 
JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA (2d ed. 2010). 
229 E.g., Richard Schmalensee, The New Industrial Organization and the Economic Analysis of Modern Markets, in 
ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY (W. Hildenbrand ed., 1982) (citing an example of this technical analysis); 
Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 217 (1976) 
(same). 
230 Bresnahan & Schmalensee, supra note 223, at 373. 
231 Bresnahan & Schmalensee, supra note 223, at 373. 
232 Bresnahan & Schmalensee, supra note 223, at 374. 
233 Among the papers were Timothy F. Bresnahan, Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: 
The 1955 Price War, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 457 (1987); Ian Domowitz, R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Petersen, 
Oligopoly Supergames: Some Empirical Evidence on Prices and Margins, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 387 (1987); Margaret 
E. Elade, Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 499 
(1987); John C. Panzar & James N. Rosse, Testing for “Monopoly” Equilibrium, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 443 (1987); 
Richard Schmalensee, Collusion Versus Differential Efficiency: Testing Alternative Hypotheses, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 
399 (1987). 
234 See also John Sutton, Is Imperfect Competition Empirically Empty, in THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT 
COMPETITION AND EMPLOYMENT: JOAN ROBINSON AND BEYOND 225 (George R. Fiewel ed., 1989) (noting the 
extent to which imperfect competition models produced testable results that were anomalous to perfect competition). 
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supply is infinitely high, and with a high wall between them and outside products.  Rather, the 
empirical landscape resembled Chamberlin’s idea more closely:  different firms compete with 
other firms by varying but empirically measurable degrees.  The boundary that determines a 
market became more arbitrary and was largely a matter of studying how individual firms and 
their customers respond to a price change of a given magnitude.  The larger the hypothesized 
price change, the larger the market. 
 
Importantly, these studies assumed relevance and importance for the price movements of 
individual firms rather than of their markets as a whole.  In perfectly competitive markets, 
individual firms do not have distinctive price movements.  In an important paper in 1988, Baker 
and Bresnahan produced a testable empirical methodology for estimating the market power of a 
single firm in a product differentiated market.235  As they observed, measuring the cross-
elasticity of demand between individual product pairs in differentiated product markets had 
proven very difficult, but it was possible to measure a firm’s own price responses to changes in 
cost or demand.  That premise was itself inconsistent with perfect competition models.  They 
examined a three-firm market for domestic beers–Pabst, Coors, and Miller-and found that Coors 
possessed significantly more market power than Pabst, which behaved more like a perfectly 
competitive firm would behave.236 
 
Methodologies for measuring the market power of firms in differentiated markets have 
become normalized and simplified, and they have become a staple of analysis in merger 
investigations.  The theory of “unilateral effects” in merger assessment, which now accounts for 
at least half of the cases,237 is empirically driven,238 flatly inconsistent with perfect competition, 
and in some but not all ways is much more consistent with monopolistic competition.239 
 
235 Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm, 6 
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 283 (1988). 
236 On the extent to which the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines take these developments into account, see Carl 
Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 
(2010). 
237 See Darren S. Tucker, A Survey of Evidence Leading to Second Requests at the FTC, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 591, 598 
(2013) (noting predominance of unilateral effects concerns in second requests). 
238 See Steven Barry & Ariel Pakes, Some Applications and Limitations of Recent Advances in Empirical Industrial 
Organization: Merger Analysis, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 247 (1993) (discussing use of empirical data).  See also Nathan 
H. Miller et al., Upward Pricing Pressure as a Predictor of Merger Price Effects, 52 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 216 
(2017) (finding these methodologies to be empirically robust); accord Sonia Jaffe & E. Glen Weyl, The First Order 
Approach to Merger Analysis, 5 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 188 (2013) (developing the methodology and 
citing earlier literature). 
239 Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 ANTITRUST 23 (1996).  See also Gregory J. Werden & 
Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 43 
(Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008) (identifying the competitive effects of mergers in different types of industries); Oliver 
Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 277 
(2010) (explaining the use of merger simulation to determine the effects of a possible merger); Jonathan B. Baker & 
David Reitman, Research Topics in Unilateral Effects Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
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One important difference is that Chamberlin’s monopolistic competition model assumed 
free entry.  By contrast, unilateral effects merger theory reaches situations where products are 
differentiated but entry barriers are high or there are barriers preventing firms from repositioning 
their products.240  Under the theory, while many firms might compete with one another, different 
pairings of firms compete more closely than others.241  Further, thanks in substantial part to 
widespread digitization of transactions, competitive responses have become far easier to 
measure.242 
 
The new methods of assessing power and effects do not require a market definition in the 
traditional sense; they measure firms’ price responses directly, not by an inference drawn from 
market share.243  For example, the technical concept of “upward pricing pressure” (UPP) refers 
to an empirical device that estimates a firm’s profit-maximizing price before and after a merger 
by balancing out reduced competition against any efficiencies that the merger might produce.244  
Here, the Supreme Court’s position in the American Express case that market power for 
assessing vertical practices requires a market definition is an unsettling step backwards, 
particularly given the fact that the issue was never briefed and neither alternative methodologies 
nor results were explored.245  What its effects will be remains to unclear at this writing. 
 
Successive editions of the United States government’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
have reflected these developments, although generally responding only after a new technique has 
become well established and normalized within the discipline.  The earliest Guidelines, 
particularly those issued in 1968 and 1984, were dominated by concerns about market definition 
 
ANTITRUST (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012)(discussing the different tools available to study merger effects); PETER DAVIS 
& ELIANA GARCES, QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (2010). 
240 Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 ANTITRUST 23, 23-24 (1996). 
241 See Tommaso M. Valletti & Hans Zenger, Mergers with Differentiated Products: Where do We Stand?, 58 REV. 
INDUS. ORG. 179, 180 (2021) (stating “it is well-known that market shares can be off the mark in trying to account 
for consumers’ heterogeneous switching patterns between differentiated products.  When robust data are available, it 
is therefore more sensible to assess competitive overlaps directly. . . .”). 
242 See Jonathan B. Baker, Why Did the Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 31 
(2004) (discussing the rise of unilateral effects).  See also Nathan H. Miller & Gloria Sheu, Quantitative Methods for 
Evaluating the Unilateral Effects of Mergers, 58 REV. INDUS. ORG. 143 (2021) (identifying the different formulas 
used to calculate unilateral effects); Gregory J. Werden, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers I: 
Basic Concepts and Models, in 2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1319 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 
2008) (highlighting unilateral effects specific to horizontal mergers). 
243 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to 
Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON. 1 (2010),   
https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/alternative.pdf [https://perma.cc/U84Y-KL8M] (showing an example of 
directly measuring a firm’s price response). 
244 Developed in Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 ANTITRUST 23 (1996).  See also Valletti, 
supra note 241; Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 246; Miller, et al., supra note 245. 
245 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 & n.7 (2018).  For a critique, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics, 101 BOSTON U. L. REV. 589, 528-31 (2021). 
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and market shares.246  The 1984 Guidelines acknowledged the relevance of product 
differentiation, but mainly to conclude that it tended to mitigate merger concerns because cartels 
were more difficult to manage in differentiated markets.247  This reflected Stigler’s position that 
the only real concern falling short of monopoly is collusion.248  The 1992 Guidelines took a 
much different approach, seeing mergers among firms producing differentiated products as a 
distinctive subset that threatened “unilateral” price increases in some cases.249  Finally, in the 
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, product differentiation and unilateral effects mergers 
emerged as a much more central feature of merger enforcement policy.  Measurement requires 
the agencies to assess differential rates of substitution among product pairs–a concept that is 
meaningless in perfectly competitive markets.250  At this writing the Biden administration has 
called for a new revision of the merger guidelines that will very likely result in increased 
enforcement.251 
 
MARKET POWER IN THE ECONOMY 
 
 
246 Copies of all the Merger Guidelines back to 1968 can be found in a digital archive maintained by the Justice 
Department.  See Department of Justice Archive, DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archives/doj-archive 
[https://perma.cc/PL5B-CGBC] (last visited Nov. 19, 2021) (listing the archived topics). 
247 See DEP’T OF JUST., 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.41 (1984), https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1984-merger-
guidelines [https://perma.cc/TXJ4-PWCF] (considering how the nature of the product and terms of sale can affect 
market power from a merger).  
248 See discussion supra, text at notes 115-118. 
249 DEP’T OF JUST., 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.21 (1992), https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1992-merger-
guidelines [https://perma.cc/L24D-BG4S]:  
 
A merger between firms in a market for differentiated products may diminish competition by 
enabling the merged firm to profit by unilaterally raising the price of one or both products above 
the premerger level.  Some of the sales loss due to the price rise merely will be diverted to the 
product of the merger partner and, depending on relative margins, capturing such sales loss 
through merger may make the price increase profitable even though it would not have been 
profitable premerger.  Substantial unilateral price elevation in a market for differentiated products 
requires that there be a significant share of sales in the market accounted for by consumers who 
regard the products of the merging firms as their first and second choices, and that repositioning of 
the non-parties' product lines to replace the localized competition lost through the merger be 
unlikely.  The price rise will be greater the closer substitutes are the products of the merging firms, 
i.e., the more the buyers of one product consider the other product to be their next choice. 
250 DEP’T OF JUST., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (08/19/2010) § 6 (2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010  [https://perma.cc/S8EA-QQJV]. See Shapiro, 
supra note 234 (explaining how the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines deals with this). 
251 Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 9, 2021).  See Herbert Hovenkamp, President Biden’s 
Executive Order on Promoting Competition: An Antitrust Analysis, __ Ariz. L. Rev. (2022), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3887776 [https://perma.cc/2EVL-J9QC] (call for the Agencies 
to revise the Merger Guidelines).  
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Progress in empirical techniques similar to those used in microeconomics has also 
resulted in greatly increased ability to measure market power across the economy, as well as 
changes in market power over time.  Those developments also speak to the invalidity of the anti-
enforcement error cost model.  They are inconsistent with the idea that markets move naturally to 
positions of greater competition. 
 
Debates about the amount of monopoly in the economy and the extent to which 
individual firms have market power have been going on for decades.  Methodologies for 
measurement that initially were crude and flawed have improved very considerably and will 
continue to do so.  The important questions include:  (1) Are industries generally becoming more 
concentrated–that is, do they have fewer firms per market? (2) If so, is there a positive link 
between market concentration and monopoly markups? (3) To what extent can monopoly 
markups be measured directly, without reference to market concentration or accordingly, market 
definition?  And (4) to what extent are larger markups a sign of a noncompetitive economy, or do 
they have alternative explanations, such as higher rates of socially beneficial innovation?  
 
Addressing these questions is less useful for deciding individual antitrust cases, but they 
do provide important information for evaluating the state and appropriate direction of 
competition policy generally.  They also speak to such issues as formation of presumptions and 
burdens of proof.  One thing the emergent answers do indicate is that any error cost bias against 
enforcement is unwarranted.  Even if the evidence that the economy is becoming less 
competitive is inconclusive, there is certainly no evidence that markets tend to work themselves 
toward greater competition in any time frame that we have been able to measure.  At most, 
therefore, there should be no anti-enforcement bias.  Indeed, to the extent that the evidence does 
indicate that the economy is becoming less competitive over time, an error cost presumption that 
favors greater enforcement is called for. 
 
Traditionally, most of these studies linked market power to concentration, or the number 
of firms in a market.  Surveys dating back to the mid-twentieth century concluded that markets 
were in fact becoming more concentrated and that the result was less effective competition, 
higher markups, and general oligopoly stagnation.252  As noted previously, the 1950 amendments 
to the merger statute was based on these views, which were already prevalent at that time.253  
They also drove important merger decisions such as Philadelphia Bank, which made increases in 
concentration a prime determinant of merger legality.254  That presumption, although with some 
 
252 Summarized in Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 951 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); see also Leonard W. 
Weiss, The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW 
LEARNING 184, 184-233 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974). 
253 See discussion supra, text at notes Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
254 United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).  See J. Robert Robinson, Philadelphia National Bank at 
50, 80 Antitrust L.J. 189 (2015) (noting the effects of the previously mentioned Supreme Court case).  For a 
convincing argument that the increase in concentration, rather than the overall market concentration, is the better 
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modifications, continues to guide horizontal merger analysis today when the theory for 
challenging the merger is the likelihood of facilitating coordinated interaction among the firms in 
a market.255 
 
One thing many of those studies shared was that they were based on industry 
classifications from what is now the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), 
administered in the United States by the U.S. Census Bureau.256  The classification systems, 
which provide various levels of detail, groups industries together by product similarity.  Today, 
most but not all studies of market concentration based on these data conclude that American 
markets are becoming less competitive.257  One good analysis of the studies over time finds small 
changes in concentration during the period from 1963 to 1982, but significant increases after 
1982 when the Merger Guidelines were revised along more neoliberal lines.258  Another study 
finds that increases in concentration have levelled off since 2002, but it does not examine the 
period prior to that, thus missing the period of greatest increase.259 
 
 These studies are not well designed for measuring the amount of monopoly in the 
economy.  An important problem is the lack of correlation between relevant markets and the 
NAICS classifications, even at the most detailed (six-digit) level.  Indeed, two authors with 
considerable experience in merger enforcement concluded in 2018 that the NAICS 
classifications could be as much as 100 times larger than the definition of a relevant market for 
antitrust purposes.260  The NAICS data are national, while many of the markets in which 
concentration is to be measured are much smaller–regional or even urban.261  Carl Shapiro 
concludes that the Census data do not permit measurement of concentration in antitrust markets 
and may not be informative at all for measuring changes in concentration over time.262  In 
 
measure, see Volker Nocke & Michael Whinston, Concentration Screens for Horizontal Mergers (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 27,533, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27533 [https://perma.cc/SW37-
DLJY]. 
255 For a qualified defense of this presumption, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, 
Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018). 
256 North American Industry Classification System, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/naics/ 
[https://perma.cc/2HFK-EFPQ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).  The system replaced the older Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) System.  See What Is the Difference Between NAICS Codes and SIC Codes?, NAICS ASS’N 
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.naics.com/what-is-the-difference-between-naics-codes-and-sic-codes/ 
[https://perma.cc/22ET-NEBV] (explaining the differences between the new and old systems).  
257 For a balanced summary, see Market Concentration – Note by the United States, OECD (June 7, 2018), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2018)59/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/6B3D-BUEW]. 
258 Sam Peltzman, Industrial Concentration Under the Rule of Reason, 57 J.L. & ECON. S3, S101 (2014). 
259 Robert D. Atkinson & Filipe Lage de Sousa, No, Monopoly Has Not Grown, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 
(June 7, 2021), https://itif.org/publications/2021/06/07/no-monopoly-has-not-grown [https://perma.cc/S5N7-C9YP]. 
260 Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Don’t Panic: A Guide to Claims of Increasing Concentration, 33 
ANTITRUST 74 (2018). 
261 Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 726 (2018). 
262 Id. at 727-28. 
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addition, concentration measures provide particularly poor estimates of market power when 
products are differentiated.263  
 
Much more promising are more recently developed approaches that measure market 
power more directly and at the individual firm level as a function of price/cost margins.264  These 
do not depend on definition of a relevant market and thus do not reflect any measure of 
concentration.  Direct measurement of monopoly power has produced evidence of disturbing 
macro- trends.265  Some of the commentary on this issue is heavily ideological and superficial, 
but even if we confine ourselves to responsible, technical measurement of market power, the 
results are about the same.  Scholars disagree about the amount266 but not the direction.  Overall, 
margins have risen,267 corporate profits have risen as a share of GDP, and labor participation has 
declined.268  While some of the increase in margins is a result of innovation, the overall effect 
 
263 See Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 1011 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989) (explaining effects of product 
differentiation). 
264 On the methodologies, see Jan De Loecker & Frederic Michel Patrick Warzynski, Markups and Firm-Level 
Export Status, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 2437 (2012). 
265 Documented in Shapiro, supra note 259.  See also Kate Bahn et al., Reviving Antitrust: Why Our Economy Needs 
a Progressive Competition Policy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 29, 2016), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2016/06/29/140613/reviving-antitrust/ 
[https://perma.cc/HM24-NN8W] (highlighting trends); Jonathan Baker, Market Power in the U.S. Economy Today, 
WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Mar. 20, 2017), https://equitablegrowth.org/market-power-in-the-u-s-
economy-today/ [https://perma.cc/Q2PH-L2QR] (same).  
266 For example, Robert E. Hall finds more modest increases in power.  See Robert E. Hall, Using Empirical 
Marginal Cost to Measure Market Power in the U.S. Economy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
25,251, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25251  [https://perma.cc/AER3-L3XS] (discussing his findings). See 
id. at 18 (finding “substantial growth in market power” over the period from 1988 to 2015, although not as great as 
some other studies).  
267 Hall, supra note 264 finds a weighted average Lerner Index increase from .11 to .28 during that period, and his 
numbers are among the more conservative.  See also Jan de Locker, Jan Eeckhout & Gabriel Unger, The Rise of 
Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications, 135 Q.J. ECON. 561, 575 (2020) (finding significant markups 
since the early 1980s). 
268 Shapiro, supra note 259, at 737.  See also Carl Shapiro, Antitrust: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It, 35 
ANTITRUST 33 (2021) (finding that “the share of the economic pie going to labor has dropped while the share going 
to the owners of large businesses has grown, and price/cost margins have generally risen in the United States in 
recent decades”); Jan De Loecker, Jan Eeckhout & Simon Mongey, Quantifying Market Power and Business 
Dynamism in the Macroeconomy (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Research. Discussion Paper No. DP16097, 2021), 
https://repec.cepr.org/repec/cpr/ceprdp/DP16097.pdf [https://perma.cc/B76U-9BLZ] (similarly finding that “[b]oth 
product and labor market dynamism, as measured by net-entry rates and labor reallocation, has decreased, as has the 
labor share and labor force participation”); Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares, 75 J. FIN. 2421 
(2020) (finding a decrease in the labor share of gross value added accompanied by a large increase in the share of 
pure profits); David Autor et al., The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23,396, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23396 [https://perma.cc/4RR6-
VTPD] (citing to another work with the same finding). 
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appears to be strongly negative.269  In any event, the idea that a significant portion of the increase 
in margins simply reflects increased innovation is not reflected in annual growth in adjusted 
GDP.270  The same thing is true of monopsony power in the labor market, which has been 
increasing during the same period, resulting in lower wages and reduced labor output.271 
 
One qualification on these studies is that large firms that invest heavily in research and 
development also tend to have higher fixed costs.  These typically show up as higher margins.  
As a result, high margins in and of themselves do not necessarily indicate noncompetitive 
performance.272  Offsetting this, however, is disturbing evidence that mergers are more likely to 
restrain innovation than to further it.273  That is to say, most of the efficiencies that result from 
large firm R&D come about by internal growth, not by merger.274  Indeed, leaving two 
innovative competitors to compete against each other rather than merging is much more likely to 
increase both output and innovation.275 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For a quarter century the empirical industrial organization literature has been racing away 
from the perfect competition models of the 1950s and before.  In the process it has produced 
solid, differentiated evidence of increasing market power in the economy on both the output and 
the input sides.  At the same time, the “relevant market” of traditional antitrust analysis is 
becoming less important and its inaccuracies and other failures increasingly prominent.  It is too 
early to jettison the concept of the relevant market from antitrust analysis, but roles have shifted.  
 
269 See De Loecker et al., supra note 266, at 1 (finding a significant growth in deadweight loss, leading to a 9 percent 
decline in welfare during the period 1980-2016). 
270 See U.S. GDP Growth Rate 1961-2021, MACROTRENDS,  https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/USA/united-
states/gdp-growth-rate [https://perma.cc/82QS-G6Y6] (last visited Nov. 19, 2021) (portraying GDP statistics via 
charts and graphs). 
271 Id.; Jose Azar, Steven Berry & Ioana Marinescu, Estimating Labor Market Power, SSRN (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3456277 [https://perma.cc/M9LP-KNXJ]. 
272 See U.S. GDP Growth Rate 1961-2021, supra note 268 (noting data specifically from the 2005-2006 period).  
273 See Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., 
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED,  (Josh Lerner & Scott Sterns eds., 2012),  
https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c12360/c12360.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG9R-GSC6] (explaining this 
phenomenon); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, __ WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), 
currently available at file:///C:/Users/herbe/Downloads/SSRN-id3771399%20(18).pdf.  See also Giulio Federico et 
al., Horizontal Mergers and Product Innovation, 59 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1 (2018) (same). 
274 See supra note 27-28. 
275 For strong empirical confirmation, see John Kwoka, The Structural Presumption and the Safe Harbor in Merger 
Review: False Positives or Unwarranted Concerns?, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 837, 837-72 (2017) (concentration over a 
certain threshold produces anticompetitive effects); accord JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND 
REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY (2015). 
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Today it should be regarded as the “alternative” rather than the primary way of assessing power, 
to be used mainly when data are limited or the relevant antitrust query compels it.276 
There is also considerable support for the conclusion that antitrust policy, but particularly 
merger policy, took a significant wrong turn in the mid-eighties.  Causality is difficult to prove.  
Very likely the biggest culprit was the change in merger policy brought about by the 1982 
Merger Guidelines,277 but the Supreme Court’s right turn on antitrust enforcement278 is certainly 
a contributing factor as well. 
The more concerning issue is why people continue to follow a position so long after it has 
lost its scientific support.  Much of it, of course, is age and path dependence.  People learn things 
when they are young, make successful careers, and are reluctant to change direction.  Nearly 
every idea worth having has provoked resistance, including Darwin, the marginalist revolution in 
economics, and the Chicago School itself.279 
 In this case, however, something more disturbing is happening.  The Chicago School has 
moved from being an exciting development in economics seventy years ago to a highly 
successful rationale for industry capture today.  Simply put, competition is a public good.  The 
interest groups that profit from a more competitive market tend to be individually powerless, 
diverse, and not particularly well organized. Indeed, that has always been the nature of 
competition.  By contrast, those who stand to gain from the preservation of high profits are 
individually larger, less numerous, and have a common set of interests in the preservation of 
profit.  This has turned the error cost anti-enforcement bias into an important vehicle for rent 




276 For example, the concept of a relevant market, or at least something similar, remains a useful tool to identify the 
range of viable competitors.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Vertical Control, N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 
2021), (U. Pa. Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 21-13, 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3793733 [https://perma.cc/T2RR-7R8J] (discussing the 
benefits of a relevant market).  
277 See discussion supra, text at notes 256. 
278 See discussion supra, text at notes 52. 
279 For some of the debates over marginalism and Darwin, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 72. 
